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The Effects of Myriad and Mayo on
Molecular-Test Development in
the United States and Europe:
Interviews from the Frontline
Johnathon Liddicoat*, Kathleen Liddell** & Mateo Aboy***
ABSTRACT

US Supreme Court decisions in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories and Association for Molecular Pathology v.

Myriad Genetics Inc. caused US and European law on what is
patentable subject matter to diverge significantly. Both cases related to
molecular tests and changed decades of patent practice. Whether the
decisions adversely affect the development of molecular tests in the
United States and Europe has been a matter of much speculation but
limited empirical investigation. This interview-based study has three
main findings. First, Myriad and Mayo have negatively affected
the development of some molecular tests. Notably, half of the US
university technology-transfer offices interviewed decided not to develop
tests, and many other organizations have found the legal uncertainty
following the cases problematic. Second, small 'atent-precarious"
organizations-those that rely heavily on patents for competitive
advantages, such as technology-transfer offices-have been the most
affected because patentprotection is now often weaker and more difficult
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to obtain. Third, US-headquartered organizations have been more
affected by 35 U.S.C. § 101 case law developments than European
organizations, even though both types of organizations file for US
patents. This Article refrains from advising law reform, however,
because this study only focused on the adverse effects of the decisions and
the positive effects remain unexamined.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Patents, which provide inventors with rights to stop others from
practicing their invention for twenty years, are commonly justified on
the ground that they incentivize research, development, and disclosure
of technological breakthroughs.' However, two recent US Supreme
Court decisions cast doubt on patents' ability to fulfill these functions
for molecular tests.
Molecular tests check for various chemical compounds, such as
DNA or proteins, that are linked to diseases. 2 Failure to incentivize new
tests is a serious issue for medicine because much of the field pivots on
results from these tests. It is also a serious issue for the emerging field
of precision medicine, which is trying to better tailor medicine to
individuals. A core component of precision medicine is providing new
and better molecular tests that help prevent, detect, diagnose, provide
prognoses, and treat diseases. 3
These two decisions restricted the subject matter that is eligible
for patent protection, a topic commonly known as "patent eligibility,"
"patentable subject matter," or "35 U.S.C. § 101."4 Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.5 ended the US Patent and
1.

See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ch. 11 (2003); 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2018, at 16-20 (2018); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic
Underpinnings of PatentLaw, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 249 (1994); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights
and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); Edmund W.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Arnold Plant,
The Economic Theory ConcerningPatents for Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30, 32 (1934).
2.
NCI Dictionary of Cancer Terms: Molecular Test, NAT'L CANCER INST.,
https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/molecular-test
[https://perma.cc/NH8T-BSKW] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
3.
See NCI Dictionary of Cancer Terms: Precision Medicine, NAT'L CANCER INST.,
https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/precision-medicine
[https://perma.cc/J9MT-SZ2K] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
4.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). Patentable subject matter is only one of several criteria that
must be satisfied for a patent application to be granted. An invention must also be, for example,
novel and nonobvious. See §§ 102, 103.
5.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
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Trademark Office (USPTO) practice of granting patents on isolated
genomic DNA, 6 and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.7 ended the USPTO's practice of granting patents on
medical relationships between molecules and health outcomes when
implemented using conventional scientific techniques.8
The new patent-eligibility standards in the United States
diverge significantly from those around the world.9 One prominent
commentator argues the changes heralded by Myriad and Mayo are so
significant that molecular tests are no longer patent eligible in the
United States,1 0 and another asserts that the decisions threaten the
next generation of tests." Indeed, in 2019, upon reviewing all relevant
decisions, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded
that "[s]ince Mayo, we have held every single diagnostic claim in every
case before us ineligible." 12
Concerns surrounding the patentability of molecular tests in the
United States have led several organizations to lobby for changes to 35
U.S.C. §

6.

101.13

The current director of the USPTO and a previous acting

See id. at 577, 593-94, 596; Dianne Nicol et al., InternationalDivergence in Gene

Patenting, 20 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 519, 529-30 (2019).

7.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
8.
See id. at 79-82.
9.
Nicol et al., supra note 6, at 534; see also Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning
Gold to Lead: How Patent EligibilityDoctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24
GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 952-60 (2017); David 0. Taylor, The Supreme Court's Revolution in
Patent EligibilityLaw: Alternative Protectionsfor Biotechnology, 37 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 227,
229-30 (2019).
10.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, DiagnosticsNeed Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 256, 286
(2015). Eisenberg actually states that "diagnostic technology is not patent-eligible." Id. (emphasis
added). One could argue that Eisenberg's quote is inapt (to this Article) because molecular
tests are different from diagnostic technology. However, since molecular tests are a subset of
diagnostics, her reference is appropriate. One could also argue that this Article makes a broader
claim than Eisenberg, as molecular tests is a broader category than diagnostics because it includes,
among other things, prognostic tests-something Eisenberg did not specifically refer to. However,
it is very common in the industry to use the term "diagnostic tests" when discussing prognostic
tests, and, indeed, this is exactly what Eisenberg did. Id. at 260.
11.
See Christopher M. Holman, The Critical Role of Patents in the Development,
Commercialization and Utilization of Innovative Genetic Diagnostic Tests and Personalized
Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 297, 315-16 (2015); see also Alice 0. Martin & Kimberly K.
Vines, FurtherErosion of Patent Protectionfor Diagnostics: The Federal Circuit Denies En Banc
Rehearing in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 44 AIPLA Q.J. 437, 456 (2016); Michael
A. Sanzo, The Patentingof Gene Based Diagnostic Assays in a Post Mayo and Myriad World, 16 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 20 (2016).

12.
Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2019).
13.
See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, AIPLA LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL AND REPORT
ON PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER 2 (2017), https://www.aipla.org/docs/default-source/advo-

cacy/aipla-legislative-proposal---patent-eligible-subj ect-matter.pdfsfvrsn=7e208efe_2
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director are generally supportive of such efforts,1 4 and this reform is
now on several senators' agendas. 15 That said, other commentators
argue that Myriad and Mayo strengthen patent policy because they
"[weed] out overly broad patents" by requiring that applicants claim a
specific and inventive way of achieving a result, rather than just the
result. 16 Their position closely aligns with the rationale offered by the
Supreme Court-namely, that patents on medical relationships and
isolated DNA risk tying up the tools of future innovation due to their
broad scope.1 7
Myriad and Mayo have been the subject of much academic
commentary, but researchers have yet to study if and how the cases
affect the development of molecular tests. Scholars have analyzed the
jurisprudence and history of the decisions,18 as well as how the judicial
decisions interact with other US laws that affect the development of
molecular tests.19 Likewise, other scholars have empirically evaluated
how the decisions affect many aspects of patent practice, including
[https://perma.cc/NX7R-4SH7]; Jorge A. Goldstein et al., The Time Has Come to Amend 35
U.S.C. § 101, 44AIPLAQ.J. 171, 173 (2016); Steven Lundberg, Dave Kappos Calls for Abolition of
Section 101, NAT'L L. REV. (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dave-kapposcalls-abolition-section- 101 [https://perma.cc/9RWB-R4WV].
14.
Director of USPTO Addressed Intellectual Property Track Opening Plenary, BIO:
BIOTEcHNOW (June 4, 2018), https://www.bio.org/blogs/director-uspto-addressed-intellectualproperty-track-opening-plenary [https://perma.cc/CL2F-TAE9]; Joseph Matal, Acting Director,
USPTO, Closing Remarks at IP & Diagnostics Symposium (Sept. 29, 2017).
15.
Scott McKeown, Senate JudiciaryLeaders Resurrect Long DormantIP Subcommittee,
ROPES & GRAY: PATENTS POST-GRANT (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.patentspostgrant.com/senatejudiciary-leaders-resurrect-long-dormant-ip-subcommittee/#page=1
[https://perma.cc/NRF4D4UU]; Kevin E. Noonan, Senate Proposal for Section 101 Reform: Effect on Biotech/Pharma
Inventions, PAT. DOCS (May 23, 2019), https://www.patentdocs.org/2019/05/senate-proposal-forsection- 10 1-reform-effect-on-biotechpharma-inventions.html?utmsource=feedburner&utmmedium=email&utmscampaign=Feed%3A+PatentDocs+%28Patent+Docs% 2 9
[https://perma.cc/7ABP-T9RY].
16.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER: REPORT ON
VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC

24 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/de-

&

fault/files/documents/101-ReportFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L32W-GXFW].
17.
See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013);
Mayo Collaborative Sers. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73 (2012).
18.
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The CuriousIncident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505 (2014); John W. Cox & Joseph L. Vandegrift, A Brief History of
Supreme Court Interest in Patent-EligibleSubject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 19 J. TECH. L.
POL'Y 181 (2014); Peter Lee, The Supreme Court's Myriad Effects on Scientific Research:
Definitional Fluidity and the Legal Construction of Nature, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1077 (2015);
Amelia Smith Rinehart, Myriad Lessons Learned, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1147 (2015); Jacob S.
Sherkow & Henry T. Greely, The History of Patenting Genetic Material, 49 ANN. REV. GENETICS
161 (2015); Brad Sherman, What Does It Mean to Invent Nature?, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1193
(2015).
19.
Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized
Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881 (2016).
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patent filing and prosecution. 20 These studies provide important
macrolevel perspectives, but microlevel data on how the cases affect
business decisions surrounding the development of tests are needed in
order to see if and how the cases actually affect the development of new
molecular tests.
This Article's study conducted thirty-seven semistructured
interviews with participants from the United States and Europe. The
divergence in US and European patent law provides a natural
experiment, enabling an examination of how different patent-eligibility
criteria affect the development of molecular tests. Interviews were
conducted with executives at molecular-test companies, managers in
technology-transfer offices at research institutes, 2 1 and patent
practitioners. The interviews explored how patent prosecution has
changed, whether the cases have created problematic levels of
uncertainty, and whether development strategies have changed on
either or both sides of the North Atlantic.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II provides a more
detailed background to the study, including an overview of the relevant
US and European law and the research questions pursued in this
Article. Part III describes the methodological features of the study. Part
IV reports the interview data. Part V distills the interview data to their
most valuable components, drawing conclusions on the effects of the
cases.

20.
See, e.g., Mateo Ahoy et al., After Myriad, What Makes a Gene Patent Claim Markedly
Different'from Nature?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 820 (2017) [hereinafter After Myriad]; Mateo
Ahoy et al., Mayo's Impact on Patent Applications Related to Biotechnology, Diagnostics and
Personalized Medicine, 37 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 513 (2019) [hereinafter Mayo's Impact];
Mateo Ahoy et al., Myriad's Impact on Gene Patents, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1119 (2016)
[hereinafter Myriad's Impact]; Mateo Ahoy et al., Was the Myriad Decision a 'SurgicalStrike' on
Isolated DNA Patents, or Does It Have Wider Impacts?, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1146 (2018)
[hereinafter Surgical Strike]; Gregory D. Graff et al., Not Quite a Myriad of Gene Patents, 31
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 404 (2013); Elizabeth J. Haanes & Jaume M. Cinaves, Stealing Fire:A
Retrospective Survey of Biotech Patent Claims in the Wake of Mayo v. Prometheus, 30 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 758 (2012).

21.
The exact title of the technology-transfer office interviewees differed, but all
interviewees' roles involved managing molecular-test technology and intellectual property. Not all
research institution-based organizations involved in the transfer and commercialization of
technology identify as "technology-transfer offices." The term is, however, in wide use and serves
as a useful label for the activities on which this study focuses.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Myriad
The key holding in Myriad22 was that isolated genomic DNA
from the human BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are not patentable subject
matter. 23 The term "isolated" refers to DNA that has been removed from
the rest of the genome. 24 Naturally occurring variants in the BRCA1
and BRCA2 DNA sequences correlate with patients' risk of developing
cancers, 25 and physicians can use the presence or absence of the
variants during diagnosis and prognosis. 26 The Supreme Court has long
held that exceptions exist to what is patent eligible, and Myriad
concerned the judicially created exception for "products of nature." 27
The Court's justification for this exception is that products of nature are
the "basic tools of scientific and technological work"; therefore, granting
patents on them risks tying up the tools of future innovation. 28
To determine whether Myriad's claims were patent-eligible
products of nature, the Court applied the "markedly different
characteristics" test.2 9 Pursuant to this test, which was derived from
earlier cases including Diamond v. Chakrabarty,30 a nature-based
product claim is patent eligible if it has characteristics that differ
markedly from naturally occurring products. 31 The Court found that
isolated DNA molecules do not exist in nature per se (in the sense that
they were man-made), 32 but the Court held that merely separating the
DNA from its surrounding genetic material did not make it markedly
different from naturally occurring DNA. 33 Consequently, Myriad's
claims to isolated forms of the BRCA gene were ineligible for patent
protection. 34

22.
Myriad was decided after Mayo; however, this Article discusses Myriad first due to
the issues it considered and its likely higher familiarity among readers.
23.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 579-80 (2013).
24.
See id. at 596.
25.
Id. at 582-83.
26.
See id.
27.
Id. at 589-90 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
28.
Id. at 589 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
71(2012)).
29.
Id. at 590-91 (quotingDiamond, 447 U.S. at 310).
30.
See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 310.
See Myriad, 569 U.S. at 589-91.
31.
32.
See id. at 593.
Id. at 591-93.
33.
34.
Id. at 596.
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The Court reached a different conclusion in relation to
complementary DNA (cDNA). 35 Scientists produce cDNA artificially by
working with an RNA template. RNA is an intermediary molecule
between DNA and the protein it encodes. 36 cDNA is thus an artificially
synthesized DNA strand based on an RNA sequence of interest. The
resulting cDNA is similar to genomic DNA, but cDNA lacks intervening
sequences of DNA that punctuate long segments of genomic DNA and
do not code for proteins. 37 The Court held that cDNA claims were nature
based but markedly different from naturally occurring DNA.
Immediately after Myriad, some commentators thought that the
decision would apply to isolated DNA claims only. 38 This would have

meant that the decision affected a relatively small range of inventions
on molecules derived from nature. However, it is now clear that the
decision applies beyond isolated DNA. One study proved this by
analyzing how frequently USPTO patent examiners cite the decision.
They found that in 85 percent of the cases where USPTO examiners cite
Myriad to reject patent claims, the examiners applied the case to
subject matter other than isolated DNA. 39 This subject matter included
peptides, proteins, antibodies, cells, and pharmaceutical compositions.
B. Mayo
Mayo held that methods to optimize dosages of thiopurine drugs
for treating autoimmune diseases such as Crohn's disease were not
patentable. 40 Patients metabolize drugs at different rates. The idea
underlying the patent for these methods was that medical professionals
could tailor the dosage to the individual's rate of metabolism by
measuring a metabolite, a compound formed during metabolism of the
drug. 1 Tailoring the dosage of thiopurine drugs is important because a
low dosage is ineffective and a high dosage can cause harmful side
effects. 42

35.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 581-82.
36.
Id. at 582.
37.
38.
See, e.g., E. Richard Gold et al., AMP v. Myriad: A Surgical Strike on Blockbuster
Business Models, SC. TRANSLATIONAL MED., July 3, 2013, at 1, 1-2.
Surgical Strike, supra note 20, at 1147-48.
39.
40.
Mayo Collaborative Sers. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73 (2012).
41.
Id. at 73-74.
42.
Id.
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The Mayo decision concerned the judicially created exception
that "laws of nature" and "natural phenomena" are patent ineligible. 43
The justification for this exception is similar to the justification for the
"products of nature" exception from Myriad: granting such patents may
"preempt" future inventions due to their broad scope.4 4 However, all

valid patent claims, to some degree, incorporate laws of nature;4 5 and
the Court stated that claims applying natural laws can be patent
eligible if they "contain other elements or a combination of
elements .

.

. sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to

significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself."4 6 In the
subsequent Supreme Court decision Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International, 4 7 which concerned a patent for computer-implemented
business transactions,4 8 the Court helpfully distilled its reasoning in
Mayo into a two-step test: (i) determine whether a claim is directed to a
patent-ineligible concept (e.g., natural laws or natural phenomena); and
(ii) if so, determine whether any additional features of the claim (either
individually or in combination) transform it into eligible subject matter
by claiming significantly more than ineligible subject matter.4 9
In Mayo, the Court held that the dosage-optimizing claims
were directed to a natural law, stating that the correlation "is a
consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are
metabolized by the body-entirely natural processes."50 The Court
then considered whether the claims contained "significantly more."51

The claims included the steps of administering the drug and
determining metabolite levels; 52 however, the Court found these steps
were "not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations" 53
into patent-eligible claims because they were "well-understood, routine,
conventional activit[ies] previously engaged in by scientists who work
in the field."5 4

43.
Id. at 70-71. The Court reviewed the controlling precedents on this topic. See id. at
80-87.
44.
Id. at 71-73.
45.
Id. at 71.
46.
Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).
47.
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
48.
Id. at 212.
49.
Id. at 217.
50.
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77.
51.
Id. at 79.
52.
Id. at 78-79.
53.
Id. at 80.
54.
Id. at 73. For convenience, this Article refers to "well-understood, routine,
conventional activities" as "conventional activities."
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Various courts have applied Myriad and Mayo to invalidate
patent claims that protect specific molecular tests. 55 In addition, courts
have applied Mayo to invalidate molecular-test platform technology
that detects DNA. Platform technology refers to technology that has
multiple applications (e.g., can be used to perform multiple molecular
tests). In Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc,5 6 the Federal
Circuit found the foundational patent for noninvasive prenatal testing
(NIPT) invalid. NIPT is a technique that allows medical professionals
to genetically test fetuses by drawing blood from a pregnant woman.
The technology relies on sequencing cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA), which
exists naturally in maternal blood. The claims in Sequenom included
the steps of obtaining a blood sample from a pregnant woman and
sequencing effDNA, but the Federal Circuit held the patent invalid
because it covered the natural phenomenon of cffDNA and did so using
conventional techniques.5 7
Although Myriad and Mayo cast doubt on the validity of patent
claims protecting various types of molecular tests and platforms, they
do not cast doubt on patents for "companion tests," which are often but
not always a subtype of molecular tests. These tests are, in short,
necessary for the safe and effective use of a corresponding drug. They
provide information such as dosage or whether a specific patient will
respond to a drug.5 8 Since Mayo, the USPTO has treated claims for
companion tests as patent eligible so long as the use of the drug is
unconventional or if all the steps in the claim amount to more than
merely "diagnosing a patient . . and instructing a doctor to generically

55.
See, e.g., Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 927 F.3d 1333,
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App'x 1013,
1016-18 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid, 905 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2018); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1356, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); In re BRCAl- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d
755, 762-65 (Fed. Cir. 2014); PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 F. App'x 65, 69-73 (Fed. Cir.
2012). It should also be noted that in In re BRCAl- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test
and PerkinElmer the courts invoked the "abstract idea" or "abstract mental process" exceptions
to patent eligibility, also described in Mayo. See, e.g., Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70-71, 82; In re
BRCAl- & BRCA2-Based HereditaryCancer Test, 774 F.3d at 763-64; PerkinElmer, 496 F. App'x
at 68. As reviewed by Rebecca Eisenberg, these exceptions operate in a similar manner for
molecular tests as the "product of nature" and "natural laws" exceptions but may operate in
different ways for drug-orientated claims. See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 271-74.
56.
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
57.
Id. at 1373, 1376; see also Martin & Vines, supra note 11, at 438-39.
Companion Diagnostics, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnos58.
tics/companion-diagnostics [https://perma.cc/W29J-7FBT] (last updated July 12, 2018).
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'treat it."'5 9 In 2018, the Federal Circuit in Vanda Pharmaceuticals,Inc.

v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd.6 0 made the § 101
criteria of companion tests easier to meet. The Federal Circuit held that
the particular method of treatment in Vanda was eligible. The
reasoning in Vanda can be applied to companion tests. Briefly, a test
is patent eligible if it is claimed as a method of treatment that
incorporates a molecular test and administers a drug, even if the drug
is already known to treat the medical indication. 6 1 The court's rationale
was that a patent claim directed to a method of medical treatment is
"not directed to" a natural law and therefore does not fail the first step
of the Mayo two-step test.6 2
This review of US case law shows how Myriad and Mayo altered
US patent practice for molecular tests. Indeed, both Myriad and Mayo
invalidated patent claims for molecular tests. On the other hand, Vanda
shows that companion tests incorporating a molecular test are
patentable subject matter. As a result, this Article's study focused on
molecular tests but excluded companion tests. The next Section
contrasts US patent law against European law.
C. European Law
European law permits a broader range of subject matter to be
patented than US law. This includes a wider variety of products derived
from nature, such as isolated DNA, and methods of in vitro detection
and diagnosis based on natural laws and phenomena (i.e., medical
correlations). 6 3 As such, US and European laws have diverged
significantly.6 4

59.
Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Life Sciences, USPTO 15 (May 4, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-ex.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WND6S23]. For a brief review of this topic, see Mayo's Impact, supra note 20, at 515.
Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int'l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
60.
The USPTO immediately reflected the case in an examination guidance memorandum.
Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Comm'r for Patent Examination Policy, U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, to the Patent Examining Corps on Recent Subject Matter Eligibility
Decision: Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. u. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals 1 (June 7, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-vanda-20180607.PDF
[https://perma.cc/6TMV-62AM].
61.
See Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1135-36; see also Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr,
supra note 60, at 2.
62.
Vanda Pharm., 887 F.3d at 1134-36.
63.
See generally Nicol et al., supra note 6, at 532.
64.
Id. at 533. For a detailed explanation of the differences between US and European
law, see Mateo Aboy et al., How Does Emerging Patent Case Law in the US and Europe Affect
PrecisionMedicine?, 37 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1118 (2019) and Nicol et al., supra note 6, at
529-33. Nicol et al. show that, as a result of Myriad and Mayo, US patent law has diverged
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The core requirement for patent eligibility under the European
Patent Convention (EPC)65 is that the claim involves "technical

character."6 6 The European Patent Office (EPO) examines EPC patents
and also decides "oppositions" that third parties raise against the
grant of these patents, while domestic courts determine infringement
and revocation disputes.

67

The EPC's implementing

rules, which

are consistent with the EU Directive on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions,6 8 state that "biological material which
is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a
technical process even if it previously occurred in nature" is patent
eligible. 69 The EPO has granted many isolated DNA patents on
this basis, 7 0 and the highest patent court in Germany, the
Bundesgerichtshof, has confirmed their eligibility.7 1

&

significantly from European patent law, as well as from many other patent laws around the world.
See Nicol et al., supra note 6, at 529-33. However, one notable difference to this divergence is
Australian patent law, which excludes isolated DNA and cDNA. See D'Arcy u Myriad Genetics Inc.
(2015) 258 CLR 334; Nicol et al., supra note 6, at 531. Ahoy et al. confirm significant differences
continue to exist between US and European law on the eligibility of biomarkers and medical
correlations, despite guidance from the European Patent Office and USPTO at the end of 2018 and
early 2019 that converged other areas of the law, including claims incorporating algorithms. See
Aboy et al., supra, at 1125.
65.
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254
[hereinafter European Patent Convention].
66.
European Pat. Off., Caselaw of the Boards ofAppeal: 9.1.1 Technical Character of the
Invention,
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/caselaw/2019//clr-id-9-1j1.htm
[https://perma.cc/A7RN-7V6V] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
67.
European Patent Convention, supra note 65, arts. 64, 94, 99, 138. For a brief overview,
see Nicol et al., supra note 6, at 525.
68.
Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) [hereinafter Biotech
Directive].
69.
European Patent Convention, Implementing Regulations to the Convention
on the Grant of European Patents, Rule 27(a), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as
amended June 28, 2018), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2016/e/r27.html
[https://perma.cc/JRS2-4L5E] [hereinafter EPC Implementing Regulations].
70.
See, e.g., Case T 0666/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Institut Curie, ¶¶ 74-76,
at 43 (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2008); Case T 0272/95 Howard Florey Inst. Of Experimental
Physiology and Medicine v. Aglietta, ¶¶ 6-9, at 10-11 (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2002).
71.
BGH Jan.
19,
2016, X ZR 141/13, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=Aktuell&Sort=12288&Seite=2&nr=74097&pos=78&anz=630
[https://perma.cc/Z3GL-HUJQ],
translated in Allison Felmy, "Receptor Tyrosine Kinase", 49 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP.
COMPETITION L. 221, 226-27 (2018). It should be noted first that several EU member states have
passed legislation that limits DNA claims to the function of the DNA described in the patent
specification. See SVEN BOSTYN ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON THE
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT LAW IN THE FIELD OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC

ENGINEERING 261 (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/18604/attachments/1/translations/_[https://perma.cc/KWM2-8VTK]. Second, the Court of Justice of the Europe Union in
Monsanto Technology LLC u Cefetra BV arguably held that all DNA claims are limited to the
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European law is also generous with respect to natural
correlations, methods of detection, and methods of in vitro diagnosis. 72
All of these claims are patent eligible provided something in the
claim confers technical character. On molecular-test methods and
the application of natural correlations, the Bundesgerichtshof in
Rezeptortyrosinkinase (Receptor Tyrosine Kinase) held that a method
claim for detecting a genomic variant, which correlated with an acute
form of leukemia, was patentable subject matter. 73 The court reached
this conclusion because the method included isolating DNA and other
technical processes.74 In reaching its decision, the Bundesgerichtshof
also noted that, unlike US law under Mayo, European and German
patent law do not require an "inventive surplus" or significantly more
for the application of a natural law to be patent eligible.7 5
The UK High Court of Justice reached a similar outcome for
broad method of detection (essentially a platform technology) patent
claims in Illumina, Inc. v. PremaithaHealth PLC. 76 The case considered
several NIPT patents, including the European equivalent of the patent
litigated in Sequenom. The claims were patent eligible (although
several were invalidated for other reasons) because they included
creation of analytic samples and detection of effDNA-steps that do not
occur in the natural world and are technical in nature.7 7

function disclosed in the specification. See Claire Baldock, Insights: The ECJ's Judgement in the
Case of Monsanto v Cefetra BV and Others, BOULT (Aug. 1, 2010), https://www.boult.com/bulletins/the-ecjs-judgement-in-the-case-of-monsanto-v-cefetra-bv-and-others/
[https://perma.cc/TJ7CAXGN].
72.
European law is stricter in relation to methods of in vivo diagnosis and methods of
medical

treatment.

See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE

EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE pt. G, ch. 11-4.2 (2019), http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/8654640290C2DBE7C12584A4004D2D9A/$File/epo-guidelines for examination
2019_hyperlinked-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/46VZ-C3E2].
73.
BGH
Jan.
19,
2016,
X
ZR
141/13,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=Aktuell&Sort= 12288&Seite=2&nr=74097&pos=78&anz=630
[https://perma.cc/Z3GLHUJQ], translatedin Felmy, supranote 71, at 227.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
See Illumina, Inc v. Premaitha Health PLC [2017] EWHC (Pat) 2930.
76.
77.
Id. at [184]-[189]. Despite Europe's generous rules on patent eligibility, European
clinical genetic-testing laboratories have not encountered profound patent problems. See
Johnathon Liddicoat et al., ContinentalDrift? Do EuropeanClinical Genetic Testing Laboratories
Have a Patent Problem?, 27 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 997, 1004-05 (2019).
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D. Predictions and Controversies
This Section describes the leading commentary, predictions, and
empirical studies analyzing the differences between US and European
law.
In the aftermath of Myriad and Mayo, a senior commentator
stated that molecular tests are "not patent eligible" in the United
States.7 8 This prediction remains untested, but empirical studies have
evaluated other effects. For instance, several studies have assessed how
Myriad andMayo have affected general aspects of patent practice in the
United States. With regard to patents granted before the decisions,
researchers have found that tens of thousands of patents are now at
risk of invalidation.79 And for patents prosecuted after the decisions,
research indicates that the USPTO has issued thousands of office
actions with 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejections, citing Myriad and Mayo.80
Applicants have opportunities to overcome rejections, and many do; the
data indicate, though, that patent-eligibility rules in Myriad and Mayo
result in claims with narrower scope.8 1
Studies of USPTO patent examination and prosecution also
show that a high proportion of applicants are abandoning applications
with Myriad-related claimS 82 and that applications that receive
Mayo-based rejections spend much longer in prosecution (compared
with claims that do not receive a Mayo-based rejection). 83 Scholars
suggest that high rates of abandonment and long prosecution times
indicate there is a high level of uncertainty surrounding the cases-in
particular, uncertainty regarding how to draft patent-eligible claims. 8 4

A USPTO report, which elicited view from the public on § 101 law,
reinforces this argument. The report details how practitioners have
found the law "unworkable," creating excessive "unpredictability in the
[granting of] patents."8 5

Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 286.
78.
79.
See Mayo's Impact, supra note 20, at 513; Graff et al., supra note 20, at 405;
Haanes & C~naves, supra note 20, at 758.
80.
Mayo's Impact, supra note 20, at 515; Surgical Strike, supra note 20, at 1147.
81.
After Myriad, supra note 20, at 823-25; Alan Douglas Miller & Brian Amos, Successful
Strategies for Diagnostic Method Patents, 23 J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 39, 40-42 (2017).
82.
After Myriad, supra note 20, at 822; Surgical Strike, supra note 20, at 1147.
83.
Mayo's Impact, supra note 20, at 516.
84.
After Myriad, supra note 20, at 822-23; Mayo's Impact, supra note 20, at 515.
Uncertainty has also been highlighted in news-style articles. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Fox, Industry
Reels as PrometheusFalls and Myriad Faces FurtherReviews, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 373,
374 (2012).
85.

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 16, at 30.
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Several commentators argue that Myriad and Mayo negatively
affect the development and commercialization of molecular tests. Their
arguments are based on three reasons.8 6 First, patents are a useful
instrument for coordinating multiple parties with complementary
development skills, including marketers and scientific experts.8 7
Patents have this effect because "parties know that only those who
strike deals with each other involving the patent can avoid being
excluded by the patent in court."88 Second, molecular tests are often
easy to imitate and produce at a lower price than the original developer.
Such imitating is often called "free riding" and is more likely to arise in
the United States under Myriad and Mayo because patents have a
narrower scope or are unavailable.8 9 Third, substantial investment,
often funded by venture capitalists (VCs),9 0 is needed to develop and

validate tests, and the weakening of patent protection for molecular
tests will inevitably cause VCs to shift their investments to other
sectors of the economy that they know have more robust patent
protection.9 1
In contrast, some question the need for patent protection.
Between 2009 and 2010, the US Secretary's Advisory Committee
on Genetics, Health, and Society studied the role of patents in
the development of genetic tests. 92 The committee "concluded
that patent-derived exclusive rights are neither necessary nor

86.
James E. Daily & F. Scott Kieff, Anything Under the Sun Made by Humans: Patent
Law Doctrines as Endogenous Institutions for Commercializing Innovation, 62 EMORY L.J. 967,
980 (2013). The authors do not specifically discuss molecular tests, referring instead to
"biotechnology." However, it is quite clear that their analysis included it. For example, the authors
discuss how Mayo affected Myriad Genetics, Inc. See id. at 978-80. It should also be noted that the
authors published this article before Myriad was decided, meaning that they could not have
considered the Supreme Court's decision. The authors' thesis in the article, however, makes it
quite clear that they would have opposed the decision. See also Kieff, supra note 1, at 724-27.
87.
Daily & Kieff, supra note 86, at 973-74; see also F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating
Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith's Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/on-coordi-

nating-transactions-in-intellectual-property-a-response-to-smiths-delineating-entitlements-in-information [https://perma.cc/XJN8-VX25].
88.
Daily & Kieff, supra note 86, at 973.
89.
Id. at 973, 980; see also Kieff, supranote 1, at 742, 747-48.
Holman, supra note 11, at 308.
90.
91.
Id.; see also Sanzo, supra note 11, at 20. Given Eisenberg stated that tests are
not patent eligible, one might expect that she would then predict various specific harms to the
development of tests. Interestingly, she didn't. Rather, she "hope[d]" that the cases will do more to
enhance test development than to suppress it. Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 286.
92.

SECY's

ADVISORY

COMM.

ON

GENETICS,

HEALTH,

&

SocY,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR
IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (2010), https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/up-

loads/20 13/11/SACGHS-patents-report20 10.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2V6-RR2N].
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sufficient conditions for the development of genetic test kits and
laboratory-developed tests."93 By "test kit," the committee was referring
to commercial products made for sale to multiple laboratories. 9 4 Kits
often include generic scientific materials (e.g., test tubes) as well as
test-specific reagents (e.g., DNA test panels, software). However, this
conclusion was based on estimated development costs of around
$10,000,95

an unrealistically low assumption given that diagnostic

executives estimate the cost to fully develop a test, including clinical
education, between $20.1 and $106 million in the United States alone. 96
That said, several factors do indicate that patent protection may not be
important for development. For example, (i) developing molecular tests
costs considerably less than developing pharmaceutical drugs;9 7
(ii) multinationals are increasingly supportive of open-science
initiatives for genomics research;98 and (iii) patent holders often do not
pay maintenance fees, meaning their rights lapse and become part of
the public domain before the full twenty years of patent life is realized.9 9
Other commentators have different predictions about how
Myriad and Mayo could affect test development. Some argue that
innovators would turn to trade secret protection instead of patents,10 0

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Doug

35.
12.
94.
Dolginow et al., Mystery Solved! What Is the Cost to Develop and Launch a

Diagnostic?, DIACEUTICS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.diaceutics.com/?expert-insight=mystery-

solved-what-is-the-cost-to-develop-and-launch-a-diagnostic
also Sachs, supra note 19, at 1894-95.
97.

See JORGE MESTRE-FERRANDIZ

ET AL.,

[https://perma.cc/QB7Z-HJ39];

OFFICE OF HEALTH ECON.,

see

THE R&D

COST OF A NEW MEDICINE (2012), https://www.ohe.org/publications/rd-cost-new-medicine
[https://perma.cc/EFZ2-JJWW]; Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20 (2016); cf Donald W.
Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of PharmaceuticalResearch, 6
BioSOCIETIES 34 (2011).
98.

KATHLEEN LIDDELL, REALISING GENOMIC MEDICINE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES

4 (2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=3102224 [https://perma.cc/RTX47BHA].
99.
Johnathon Liddicoat et al., Are the Gene-Patent Storm Clouds Dissipating?A Global
Snapshot, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 347, 350 (2015).

100.

See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Jacob S. Sherkow, The Changing Life Science Patent

Landscape, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 292, 294 (2016); Kevin E. Noonan, Roche Molecular

Systems, Inc. v. Cepheid (Fed. Cir. 2018), PAT. DOCS (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/20 18/10/roche-molecular-systems-ine-v-cepheid-fed-cir-20 18.html?utmsource=feedburner&utmmedium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PatentDocs+%28Patent+Does% 2 9
[https://perma.cc/ZTG7-MTU6]; see generally Derek E. Bambauer, Secrecy Is Dead - Long Live
Trade Secrets, 93 DENV. L. REV. 833, 838 (2016); Chris Palmer, The Myriad Decision: A Move
Toward Trade Secrets?, 22 NIH CATALYST, Mar.-Apr. 2014, at 9; Taylor, supra note 9, at 229.
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with the negative effect that innovations would be kept from society.101
One study explored this prediction by interviewing patent practitioners,
legal academics, and scientists involved with genetic technology. 102 It
found increased interest in trade secrets but no instances of parties
using trade secrets instead of patents. 103 That said, the study
interviewed people who might advise others to rely on trade secrets, not
those who would actually make the decision. 104
The divergence between US and European patent-eligibility law
led some commentators to question whether there would be ripple
effects for Europe. 105 Would European organizations be advantaged by
the more generous European patentable subject-matter laws? Most
commentators predicted that the effect, if any, would be negligible. 106
The reasoning here was that US patent law applies equally to US and
European organizations and that the United States is likely the most
lucrative market for most tests.
This Section describes the leading commentary, predictions, and
empirical studies analyzing the differences between US and European
law. In particular, this Section focuses on commentators' predictions of
how Myriad and Mayo would adversely affect the development of
molecular tests. These predictions build on orthodox justifications for
patents and suggest that test developers now avoid developing tests due
to narrower scope of protection and increased uncertainty that patents
are valid.
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS
This Part describes the research questions and methods in this
Article. The research questions build on the predictions in the previous
Section, and the methods primarily concern how the interviews were
arranged and conducted.

101.
Anna B. Laakmann, The New Genomic Semicommons, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1001,
1013-16 (2015); Noonan, supra note 100; see also Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy
in Genetic Testing: ClinicalData as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUR. J. HUm. GENETICS 585, 585 (2013).
102.
Christi J. Guerrini et al., Constraintson Gene PatentProtectionFuel Secrecy Concerns:
A QualitativeStudy, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 542, 546 (2017).
103.
Id. at 553.
104.
Id. at 562.
105.
LIDDELL, supra note 98, at 6-7; Nicol et al., supra note 6, at 535.
106.
LIDDELL, supra note 98, at 6-7.
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A. Research Questions
This Article's study set out to explore whether any of
the negative effects and consequences predicted by the commentators
were evident in the development of molecular tests. The study
also explored whether the effects were felt equally by US- and
European-headquartered organizations.
Each interview was semistructured, meaning they were
organized around a series of questions that permitted in-depth
exploration of the various issues under research:
1. What role do patents and other intellectual property (IP) play
in the development of molecular tests?
2. How (if at all) have patent prosecution strategies changed
after Myriad and Mayo?
3. Does Myriad or Mayo create problematic uncertainty?
4. In what ways (if any) have developmental strategies altered
due to Myriad and Mayo?
5. Does Myriad or Mayo create a disadvantage for
US-headquartered organizations compared with European
counterparts?

B. Methods
This study was designed to complement the results of previous
empirical studies, which analyzed the impact of Myriad and Mayo at
the macro level, by conducting semistructured interviews at the micro
or organizational level. Semistructured interviews, which do not follow
a rigorous set of questions but do cover the same set of topics with each
interviewee, permit deep analyses of issues and flexibility based on
interviewees' responses. Thus, semistructured interview-based
research is particularly useful in obtaining complex information about
experiences and decision-making, especially from individuals who
share similar interests and respond to the same events. 107 Indeed,
interview-based research, notwithstanding small sample sizes, has
some advantages over other empirical methods, such as surveys,
because it can identify and obtain context-rich data to explain
previously unknown responses. 108 These attributes of interview-based

NATASHA MACK ET AL., QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS: A DATA COLLECTOR'S
107.
FIELD GUIDE 1-4 (2005); HERBERT J. RUBIN & IRENE S. RUBIN, QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWING: THE
ART OF HEARING DATA 1-18 (2d ed. 2005).
108.

RUSSELL K. SCHUTT, INVESTIGATING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE PROCESS AND PRACTICE

OF RESEARCH 328-29 (7th ed. 2012).
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research are particularly important in the molecular-test industry,
where little is known about how organizations use patents in their
development strategies 0 9 and the development of tests can be
complex.110
C. Interviewee Inclusion Criteriaand Characteristics
This Section gives an overview of the people that were
interviewed, including the criteria that were used to determine if
someone should be interviewed.
Three different categories of industry participants were
interviewed: patent practitioners, executives at molecular-test
companies, and technology-transfer office (TTO) managers at research
institutes or universities. At least six interviews were conducted in each
category in both the United States and Europe. Thirty-seven interviews
were conducted in total.
Four interviews were conducted face-to-face and thirty-three
were conducted via phone. Thirty-five interviewees agreed to have the
interview recorded and transcribed. The other two interviewees agreed
to have notes taken during the interview, which were supplemented
immediately after the interview. The interviews were coded using
NVivo 11 for Mac, according to the research questions, in order to
perform thematic analysis, which refers to analyzing the data to find
patterns and themes in responses to the questions, as well as latent
content analysis, which looks to draw greater meaning from the
interviews by combining responses from different questions.'
Recruitment began in February 2017, and the last interview was
conducted in July 2018. This seventeen-month period was primarily
due to protracted recruitment of companies. Making contact with them
was challenging, especially in the United States where contact details
for potential interviewees are infrequently published online. Before any
individual was invited to participate, their profile was checked to
ensure they dealt with molecular-test technology and IP. No

109.
See Ashish Arora & Suma Athreye, Introduction to the Special Section on Patent
Use, 45 RES. POL'Y 1323, 1323 (2016). Some of the better explorations of how patents fit into
organizations' development strategies have been performed by the US Department of Health and
Human Services. See SECY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, supra note 92, at 20-35.

110.
See Aleksandr Ivanov, Barriers to the Introduction of New Medical Diagnostic Tests,
44 LAB MED. e132 (2013); Rosanna W. Peeling et al., A Guide for DiagnosticEvaluations, 4 NATURE
REVIEWS MICROBIOLOGY S2 (Supp. 2006); Sachs, supra note 19; D. L. Sackett & R. B. Haynes, The
Architecture of Diagnostic Research, 324 BMJ 539 (2002).
111.
See MARIA J. MAYAN, ESSENTIALS OF QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 93-94 (2009).
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interviewee was offered an inducement to participate, and all were
assured anonymity. All interviewees gave verbal consent to participate.
The average interview lasted forty-eight minutes, with a range
of twenty-nine to seventy-six minutes. Although the interview times
varied considerably, all topics were explored with each interviewee.
Two reasons account for the range of interview times: (i) interviewees
had varying experience with Mayo or Myriad, and (ii) interviewees
engaged in discussion to varying degrees of detail.
Interviewee recruitment varied depending on the category.
Patent practitioners were identified from lists of highly ranked
practitioners. 11 2 US practitioners were recruited from across the
country, and European practitioners were recruited from the United
Kingdom only. US practitioners included agents and attorneys, and UK
practitioners included attorneys and solicitors. Interviewees with
different training and different skills (e.g., drafting patents or drafting
transactions) were included in order to ensure that all of the various
issues at stake here were covered. All practitioners interviewed were
partners except one who was an associate with seven years' experience
and was described by a partner as an expert in the field. All invitations
to practitioners were sent via email.
Companies were recruited via online searches, attendee lists
from conferences, and a specialized website. 11 3 The companies
interviewed were headquartered across Europe and the United States.
The size of the companies interviewed varied: one company from the
United States and one company from Europe identified as large; two
from each territory identified as medium-sized; and the other
companies identified as small. One small company in the United States
and two from Europe had yet to launch a molecular test. All companies
(from both territories) had at least one test they were developing that
was "highly innovative" in the sense that it offered insights not
currently available to medical practitioners and was based on new
biomarkers or scientific techniques. Such tests would, for example,
identify patients that would not benefit from surgery but are currently
treated as patients that would.
TTOs were recruited only from leading biological science
institutes, as indicated in research rankings (e.g., The Times Higher
112.
CHAMBERS & PARTNERS, https://chambers.com [https://perma.cc/6AUN-PSDU] (last
visited Mar. 23, 2020); IP STARS, https://www.ipstars.com [https://perma.cc/W37Y-8NF8] (last
visited Mar. 23, 2020); LEGAL 500, http://www.legal500.com [https://perma.cc/JJ25-YKR7] (last
visited Mar. 23, 2020); LMG LIFE SC., https://www.lmglifesciences.com [https://perma.cc/Y9EMCMFD] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
113.
BIOPHARMGUY, https://biopharmguy.com [https://perma.cc/LWT5-UTXT] (last visited
Mar. 23, 2020).

2020]

MYRIAD & MAYO ONMOLECULAR-TESTDEVELOPMENT

805

Education World University Rankings). US TTOs were recruited from
across the United States, and European TTO managers were recruited
from the United Kingdom only, due to proximity and familiarity with
English. All invitations to TTOs were sent via email.
IV. RESULTS: INTERVIEW DATA

This Part describes the results from the interviews, largely
following the order of the research questions.11 4
A. What Roles Do Patents and Other IntellectualProperty Play in the
Development of Molecular Tests?
To appreciate properly the importance of patents for
molecular-test development (and therefore the implications of Myriad
and Mayo), this Section begins by summarizing the responses on the
technical and economic environment in which test developers operate.
This Section then proceeds to describe how TTOs and companies use
patents and other IP when developing molecular tests.
1. Background on Developing Molecular Tests
Companies and TTOs described developing tests as generally a
high-risk proposition. No interviewee gave specific data on the chances
of a new test making it to market, but they estimated a test had a worse
chance of successfully reaching market than, for example, new
mechanical equipment, but a better chance than a drug. Several
companies also described how costs could vary substantially from
$1 million to $150 million for the full development and launch of a test
in multiple countries and could vary in duration from two to thirty
years. These figures roughly align with the literature.1 15 They also
explained that developing new molecular tests that rely on new
biomarkers or new technical instruments is normally at the more
expensive end of the spectrum. The novelty of the biomarker or
instrument means that there is little scientific support at the outset; it
must be generated.

114.
Due to privacy concerns, the interviews cited in this Article are confidential. They
remain on file with the Authors.
115.
See JOSH MAKOWER ET AL., FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION:
A SURVEY OF OVER 200 MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 28 (2010), https://www.advamed.org/sites/default/files/resource/30_10_11_10_20 10StudyCAgenda-makowerreportfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RTQ9-3ETH]; Dolginow et al., supra note 96; see also Aaron V. Kaplan et al.,
Medical Device Development, 109 CIRCULATION 3068, 3069, 3072 (2004).
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One company provided a relatively precise account of costs,
based on the money it had raised for the development of a new test
using a new platform. Overall, it had spent (130 million over ten years.
Approximately 80 percent of that was spent on technical development,
including clinical trials and scaled-up production. The remainder was
spent on commercialization, including marketing, development of
supply chains, and clinical education. On clinical education, the
company commented that it is expensive and challenging to inform
medical professionals about new tests and convince them to implement
tests into their workflows, even with data showing the test is
cost-effective and improves patient outcomes. 116 Indeed, that company
commented that it launched its product after five years of technical
development but had continued to invest in work to demonstrate utility
and to educate professionals. 117
The
companies
mentioned
various
other
challenges
surrounding the development of tests and their patent positions. Two
challenges were described by every company, indicating common
importance: regulation and reimbursement. In the United States,
diagnostic kits are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and the regulatory challenges center on the data needed for FDA
authorization (clearance or approval). Companies described various
issues in obtaining authorization, including difficulties with clinical
trial design and recruitment,1 18 not to mention results, which may or
may not support authorization. Companies also described how it could
take years to receive market authorization, especially in the case of
technology and biomarkers unfamiliar to the FDA. This finding is
echoed in the literature.11 9 European regulation for market
authorization of molecular-test kits was considered a lower hurdle,
although several companies said it could still pose a challenge because
the regulator might ask for different data. 120 They also said European
regulation is set to change, with the In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices

116.
See Ivanov, supra note 110, at e135.
117.
The Authors did not interview people responsible for incorporating tests into
medical practice. However, various sources describe the myriad concerns and evaluations that are
often considered before a test is incorporated. See id.; Peeling et al., supra note 110; Steven M.
Teutsch et al., The Evaluation of Genomic Applications in Practice and Prevention (EGAPP)
Initiative:Methods of the EGAPP Working Group, 11 GENETICS MED. 3 (2009).
118.
See Sackett & Haynes, supra note 110 (describing specific challenges at trials).
119.
DRIVEN

CAMBRIDGE
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DIAGNOSTICS:

A

CONSUMER

http://www.medevien.com/land-

ing/pdfs/USDiagnosticsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L52-ATKE]; MAKOWER ET AL., supra note
115, at 6.
120.
See MAKOWER ET AL., supra note 115, at 6; Kaplan et al., supra note 115, at 3071-72.
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Regulation ushering in higher standards. 12 1 Analysts suggest that
under the earlier law the "majority" of test kits are self-certified, but
under the new regime 80 percent will be reviewed by a regulator. 122
In many cases, the need for FDA clearance or approval can be
avoided if companies choose to launch a laboratory-developed test
(LDT) instead of a test kit. LDTs need to comply with less onerous
clinical-laboratory laws. 123 This means LDTs can generally be
developed faster and cheaper than kits, but there are tradeoffs that may
affect supply or demand. 124 One tradeoff is that LDTs require a
reference laboratory, where clients must send samples for processing.
This might be inconvenient, or samples might degrade when they are
sent to the reference laboratory for testing. Companies also described
how LDTs typically have lower reimbursement rates, in part because
the FDA has not reviewed them.
The respondents described reimbursement challenges as just as
important, if not more important, than all other challenges.
"Reimbursement" refers to the processes by which physicians and
hospitals receive payments (usually from insurers) for the products and
services they provide patients, such as molecular tests. 125
Reimbursement determinations are made by private or public payors
after analyzing clinical and economic data to determine the clinical
value and effectiveness of a test. 126 All companies with experience in
US reimbursement determinations (five of six companies in the
United States, and four of six in Europe) described them as complex and

121.
Regulation 2017/746, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017
on In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices and Repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission
Decision 2010/227/EU, 2017 O.J. (L 117) 176.
122.

See RONALD

BOUMANS,

EMERGO,

UNDERSTANDING

EUROPE'S NEW

IN VITRO

DIAGNOSTIC MEDICAL DEVICES REGULATION: WHAT MANUFACTURERS NEED TO KNOW AHEAD OF

IVDR IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2016), https://www.emergobyul.com/resources/articles/white-paper-euivdr [https://perma.cc/LG9M-NVFD]; HOWARD BROADBRIDGE, NSF HEALTH SCIS. MED. DEVICES,
NEW EU MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION ADOPTED APRIL 5TH 2 (2017), https://www.nsf.org/news-

room pdf/NSFMDEUMDRIndustryForumWhitepaperLTENLMD-748-0417_REF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Z4E-GLXF].
123.
Laboratory Developed Tests, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures/invitrodiagnostics/1aboratorydevelopedtests/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/C3WH-PH74] (last updated Sept. 27, 2018). But see Ivanov, supra note 110, at
e132 (describing an exception to this position).
124.
See Roger D. Klein, Intellectual Propertyand Regulation ofMolecular Pathology Tests,
20 CANCER J. 85, 88-89 (2014).
125.
Martin Gold, Getting Reimbursement for Your Product in the United States, NATURE:
BIOENTREPRENEUR
(June 23, 2003),
https://www.nature.com/bioent/2003/030601/full/bioent738.html [https://perma.cc/BQ7R-PZSF].
126.
Id.
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time-consuming, 12 7 especially due to the different approaches for
determining reimbursement. Companies noted that similar challenges
were faced between European countries, due to different systems, and
that some individual European countries presented US-like issues, but
not on the same scale of complexity. 128
The molecular-test industry distinguishes between three types
of data for molecular tests: (i) analytic validity, the ability to measure
accurately and reliably the marker of interest; (ii) clinical validity, the
strength of association between the biomarker(s) and the clinical
outcome(s); and (iii) clinical utility, the effect the test has on patient
management coupled with economic value. 129 Companies noted that it
was possible to launch tests in the United States and Europe without
clinical-utility data and with no plans to produce any, thereby avoiding
the cost and inconvenience of generating the data; but they advised that
this was often not a prudent commercial decision, primarily because
payors would be less willing to reimburse the test or only do so at a
relatively low rate. 130 All companies described how they conducted
clinical trials and combined this data (or at least planned to) with
economic analyses to produce clinical-utility data.
2. TTOs
TTOs stated unanimously that patents were core to their work.
None aimed to launch a test themselves, and it was important to them
to transfer the technology fairly early in its development to another
organization either by licensing or assigning the technology. They
described patents as core because they offered definable, exclusive, and
transferable rights. Patents helped attract partners and VC funding for
early development. 13 1 Without patent protection, TTOs said they had
little to offer in a deal because their researchers' work would be

127.
See id.
128.
See Kaplan et al., supra note 115, at 3071-72.
129.
Teutsch et al., supra note 117, at 6; Gold, supranote 125.
130.
See generally Julia R. Trosman et al., Health Technology Assessment and Private
Payers' Coverage of PersonalizedMedicine, 7 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 18s (2011); Gold, supra note
125. Similarly, FDA clearance does not guarantee clinical update either, especially without
clinical-utility data. See Recommendations from the EGAPP Working Group: Testing for
Cytochrome P450 Polymorphisms in Adults with Nonpsychotic Depression Treated with Selective
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, 9 GENETICS MED. 819 (2007).
131.
See Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, To Patent or Not: Faculty Decisions and
InstitutionalSuccess at Technology Transfer, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 99, 108 (2000); George Poste,
Molecular Diagnostics:A Powerful New Component of the Healthcare Value Chain, 1 EXPERT REV.
MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 1, 2 (2001).
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published. Indeed, all TTOs thought that transferring test technology
without a patent was unlikely.
TTOs also stated unanimously that they tended to avoid
licensing strategies based on trade secret protection but did value
know-how. The problem with licensing strategies based on trade secrets
was that they could compromise researchers' abilities to publish for the
duration of the deal. 132 Know-how, which refers to practical knowledge
or skill, is different because although researchers might not keep it a
secret, the industry norm is not to write about it. Know-how can retain
value because often only a few people know about it; examples included
details of how to use a specific instrument or optimize an assay. 133
TTOs discussed other types of IP but only occasionally identified
them as valuable. For instance, copyright might sometimes play an
important role, particularly if it protected compilations of data or
algorithms. Generally, however, they said copyright conferred only a
weak advantage because, as a matter of collaborative behavior, data
were often shared and combined with other data without intending the
use to be exclusive (especially in large research consortia) and, as a legal
matter, copyright protection did not prevent similar algorithms being
produced using the underlying ideas. Other forms of IP, including
European database rights and trademarks, were briefly discussed but
dismissed as generally not useful.
TTOs also discussed competitive advantages other than IP. Four
TTOs describe how physical property could be important in deals. For
example, they might have a reagent or instrument important for the
molecular test that was known and used by their organization only or
at most by a small number of other people worldwide. The TTOs
acknowledged that other parties could probably make the property with
a degree of effort, but given the TTOs' existing expertise, the property
could form a valuable competitive advantage. Other competitive
advantages included scientific lead time and star scientists.

1 34

Without

these, competitors would find it difficult to imitate tests. Star scientists
with a track record of successful innovations added extra value.

132.
One TTO did describe licensing a test based on confidential data without a patent.
They admitted, though, that this was the exception to the rule, and it arose as a concomitant of
the research rather than a deliberate strategy.
133.
The importance of know-how (otherwise known as "tacit knowledge") has been
described elsewhere. See, e.g., Ashish Arora, Contracting for Tacit Knowledge: The Provision of
Technical Services in Technology Licensing Contracts, 50 J. DEV. ECON. 233 (1996).
134.
See Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby, Star Scientists and Institutional
Transformation: Patterns of Invention and Innovation in the Formation of the Biotechnology
Industry, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 12709 (1996).
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However, in all circumstances, the TTOs described how the value of
these advantages varied and were not necessary for a deal.
The core nature of patents prompted discussions about patent
prosecution strategies. The TTOs used slightly differing strategies but
also shared some common elements. All TTOs preferred to transfer
technology as early as possible in the patent's lifecycle. One TTO said
they preferred to license before a provisional application expired and
before they had to make the more expensive full patent application,
enabling them to pass on the patent filing costs. 1 35 A number of TTOs
described that they were generally happy to hold patents filed via the
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 136 until national-phase entry 137-that
is, usually thirty months from the earliest priority date. 138 The reason
for this was that national-phase costs are significantly higher than
those incurred when initially filing. 139 Only two TTOs commented that
they held patents longer than this on a regular basis without interest
from a potential licensee.
One difference between US and European TTOs' patenting
strategies was the jurisdiction where protection was sought. All the US
TTOs said they focused on the United States as their primary market
and would always seek patent protection there. Five US TTOs added
they would look at Europe as well as other territories (e.g., Canada,
China, Japan, Australia) as secondary considerations. Obtaining
foreign protection, however, depended on many variables, including
A US practitioner stated that the practitioner knew of several TTOs that often used
135.
the date of a full application as a deadline for some projects. That is, if the test was not licensed
by then, the TTOs' role in developing the test would cease.
Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
136.
137.
"National phase" is "the second of the two main phases of the PCT procedure. It follows
the international phase and consists in the processing of the international application before
each Office of or acting for a Contracting State that has been designated in the international
application." See Chapter 2: Entry into the National Phase (General), WIPO,
https://www.wipo.int/pet/en/guide/np02.html#_chapt2 [https://perma.cc/E9X7-ATTL] (last visited
Mar. 23, 2020).
PCT FAQs - Protecting Your Inuetions Abroad: Frequently Asked Questions About
138.
the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/pet/en/faqs/faqs.html
[https://perma.cc/YHZ2-HLTD] (last updated Oct. 2017); Time Limits for Entering National/Regional Phase Under PCT Chapters I and 11, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/pet/en/texts/time_1imits.html [https://perma.cc/4PRN-MA3Z] (last updated Jan. 2, 2020).
139.
Anthony de Andrade & Venkatesh Viswanath, Estimating the Cost for Filing,
Obtaining and Maintaining Patents Across the Globe, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 28, 2016),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/08/28/cost-filing-obtaining-maintaining-patents/id=72336/
[https://perma.cc/XH5H-ZKEJ]; Delaying the Costs Associated with National Stage Entry, RWS
(Apr. 9, 2013), https://www.rws.com/insights/delaying-the-costs-associated-with-national-stageentry/ [https://perma.cc/CC5D-YP4U]; The Financial Realities of Patent Protection, DEHNS,
https://www.dehns.com/site/information/information sheets/the cost of-a-patent/
[https://perma.cc/PE8Q-Y3H3] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
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potential markets and potential licensees. The remaining TTOs stated
they would consider patent protection outside the United States only if
a licensee had shown interest in the test technology. All European
TTOs, by contrast, stated that European and US patent protection were
of similar importance. TTOs (in both territories) also stated there were
exceptions to these strategies, such as when the test is specifically
designed for use in developing countries. In general, however, European
TTOs were likely to obtain both US and European patents as a top
priority, whereas US TTOs would always obtain US protection and
consider European patents (or patents elsewhere) as a secondary
consideration.
TTOs described that their decisions on international patent
protection were mostly determined by a sense of where profits could be
made. Indeed, all interviewees, not just TTOs, commented that if a
molecular test was launched around the world (or at least in the
territories mentioned), US profits would be the most valuable, with
sometimes half of the overall profit made there.
3. Companies
The companies interviewed were united in their view that
patents were important for the development of molecular tests. 140 None
of them were developing a test without patent protection. However,
they had different views on the role patents played, and they also relied
on patents less than TTOs.
Companies often used patents in more than one role. The most
common roles were that they could attract partners and investment
(VC, private equity, or strategic investors). Eleven companies noted
that patents were key for this function. Nine of these eleven companies
also said that patents blocked, or potentially blocked, competitors from
entering their markets and that the exclusive rights provided by a
patent attracted partners and VCs.
All companies had some experience producing clinical-utility
data and were able to speak about the connection between such data
and patents. Five said that there was a direct connection between
obtaining patents, funding, and partners (where necessary) and that,
therefore, patents affected their ability to produce clinical-utility
data.14 1 Another three companies also thought that patents had some

140.
See Sibylle Gaisser et al., The Phantom Menace of Gene Patents, 458 NATURE 407, 408
(2009).
141.
See also Kathleen Liddell et al., Patentsas Incentives for TranslationalandEvaluative
Research: The Case of Genetic Tests and Their Improved Clinical Performance, 2008 INTELL. PROP.
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bearing on the production of clinical-utility data but that this work
actually depended to a greater extent on other factors, such as the team
behind the test, the potential profit of the test, and other competitive
advantages.
Three of the companies that saw a connection between patents
and the resources that went into producing clinical-utility data were
critical of the emphasis that some partners and VCs placed on patents.
In their experience, by the time products were launched, the patents
offered limited or no protection. They also commented that competitors
could often "invent around" patents and produce similar tests without
infringing. At the same time, however, these companies acknowledged
that patent protection was useful for deterring others from simply
copying the test. They also noted that knowing in advance whether
patent protection will be important for the test's final market is often
difficult; generally only in hindsight are there indications of whether
patent protection was necessary or not. The final test market is often
different from the market that was envisaged at the time of application
for patent protection.
Two companies also thought that patents gave them confidence
that they had freedom to operate (FTO). Part of the patenting process
is to generate search reports and prior art analyses, and, in doing this,
those companies become more confident that they are not infringing
other patents. Other companies (and practitioners) were critical of this
approach, insisting that conclusions about FTO should be drawn only
after a formal FTO analysis and that search reports should not be used

as proxies.
Corporate views about the jurisdictions for seeking patent
protection followed a similar pattern to the TTOs. That is, US
companies primarily focused on US patents, while European companies
focused on both US and European patents. Three examples illustrate
these approaches: (i) a US start-up let its European patents lapse
because the company did not think it had the resources to pursue a
European launch and because the patents were expensive to maintain;
(ii) a midsize US company said it had launched in Europe but had not
been able to make substantial profits there, despite holding a patent;
and (iii) a midsize European company launched first in Europe and then
in the United States, and then subsequently moved the bulk of its
operations to the United States, where it was generating the most
profit.

Q. 286, 287 (discussing whether the patent system provides an effective incentive for producing
and disseminating genetic diagnostic tests with good clinical validity).
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A distinguishing characteristic between TTOs' and companies'
use of IP was that companies thought, in addition to patents, trade
secrets could be particularly valuable. For example, they foresaw useful
and valuable trade secrets in data, algorithms, reagents, methods, and
ways to optimize tests. A trade secret reported by one company was a
"dummy" component inserted into its kit to make copying more
challenging and infringing activity easier to identify. One company
even rated a trade secret as more valuable than its patents because, in
its opinion, the trade secret was the key to copying the test.
Companies described several other types of competitive
advantage. Like TTOs, they referred to star scientists, scientific lead
time, and physical property, and they described how their approach to
these advantages did not differ substantially. In addition, two
companies commented that a type of clinician inertia gave them some
advantage. That is, competitors had to convince medical professionals
to "switch" to a new test kit, which could be difficult for them due to the
goodwill in the test and the technology platform they had generated.
These companies even admitted their technology was open to copying;
the scope of their patent protection did not completely cover their tests,
which had changed since the original patent applications, but no
competitors had yet entered.
Other forms of competitive advantage available to companies
included negotiating reimbursement rates and overcoming regulatory
hurdles. Six companies described how these steps required significant
time and expertise and that competitors could not enter their markets
unless they too could address these challenges. These companies
acknowledged that LDT providers could compete with kit providers but
said that, in many ways, these were different markets. For example, a
laboratory would be reluctant to send a test to a reference laboratory if
it could perform the test more quickly and at a similar price using a kit.
B. Adapting to Myriad: Drafting Claims, Uncertainty, and
Development Strategies
This Section details how interviewees adapted to issues
presented by Myriad. It focuses on changes to drafting patent claims,
certainty regarding the validity and the grant of patents, and changes
to commercial strategies for developing molecular tests.
1. Practitioners
US practitioners stated that, in principle, they had a clear idea
about what amounted to an eligible claim for molecular-test technology
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in compliance with Myriad. This means that they thought they could
draft claims that examiners were likely to consider patentable subject
matter or that, if given a claim, they had a confidence in their
assessment of whether it was valid. A consequence of Myriad, however,
was that they generally thought that the individual claims were
narrower in scope and thus offered less valuable protection. 142 One
practitioner agreed with this comment from the viewpoint of individual
claims, but they also argued that the variety of different claims that
they could obtain for nature-based products often meant that,
cumulatively, their clients obtained a similar breadth of protection. One
practitioner thought that there was still some uncertainty for some
nature-based products, and another admitted to being "very cautious"
when approaching claims that raised Myriad issues. Yet both were
relatively confident in what they considered eligible.
The picture differed for patents granted before Myriad was
decided. The practitioners thought that many patents were likely
invalid, but only one practitioner had advised on one. That practitioner
explained that the patent was identified in an infringement dispute.
The litigants accepted it was invalid, so the case continued based on
other patents. The practitioner also added that, even if valid, the patent
was unlikely to have a bearing on the dispute because the technology
was now quite old and had been superseded by noninfringing
technology.
On test development strategies, all US practitioners described
how Myriad had prompted more discussions with clients on trade
secrets, but none knew of clients that had decided to use trade secrets
instead of patents. Similarly, none of the practitioners knew of a client
who had changed a development strategy due to the case.
European practitioners' experience with Myriad was similar to
their US counterparts, albeit they added that they probably
encountered fewer Myriad-related issues because clients could raise
them with US practitioners without involving European advisers. None
of the European practitioners reported particular difficulties advising
on Myriad-relatedissues. Likewise, none of the European practitioners
reported that a client had changed development strategies due to the
case.
Two European practitioners reported substantial issues with
Myriad for nature-based products unrelated to molecular tests. One
practitioner described how they had encountered ongoing difficulties
obtaining claims for a cell-based therapeutic, elaborating that if the

142.
Many of the ways to draft Myriad-compliant claims have been described. See, e.g.,
After Myriad, supra note 20, at 823-24.
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claim to the compound was not granted, then third parties might be
able to imitate the drug. The practitioner added that the method claims
they were pursuing were probably valid and would probably provide
their client with enough protection; nevertheless, the practitioner
thought the case created an unnecessary risk for the drug's
development. The other practitioner reported that a US pharmaceutical
client had abandoned development of a drug because Myriad limited
the protection available for the compound and therefore made the
project too risky.
2. Companies
Of the six US companies interviewed, four had not encountered
Myriad-related issues. They commented that they had not needed to
seek patent protection for products merely isolated from nature;
therefore, the case passed largely unheeded. One of these companies
recalled a situation when it could have obtained patent protection for a
biomarker, assuming it was not recorded in prior art databases, but the
respondent noted that the point was moot because it had obtained
sufficient patent protection with other claims.
The remaining two US companies had encountered Myriad
issues, but only one said its business operations had been affected by
it. The company that had not been affected explained that, during the
due-diligence process for a business deal, it found patent claims that
were probably invalid pursuant to the case. However, it also decided
that this had little consequence because even if the claims were valid,
the patents would have provided limited protection for the molecular
tests.
The sixth company had a much more complex story. It described
a situation where it had a number of patents granted on Myriad-related
subject matter before the decision, plus several pending patents where
the examination process commenced before the decision and carried on
afterwards. It also said that it had continued to apply for similar
patents after the decision. The company said that, immediately after
the case, patent examiners raised Myriad-based rejections that
narrowed the pending patents. It lost claims the company desired for
its business and thought that, even after examination concluded, there
was a higher-than-normal degree of uncertainty about the validity of
some claims. As for the patents granted before the decision, the
company recognized that many of the claims had doubtful validity, but
it had not amended them because of the difficulties and risks in that
process. It also added there was some value in leaving these patents on
the register, as the patents might discourage competitors from
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researching in the area or encourage potential partners to contact the
company. Despite the fact that Myriad had narrowed and introduced
risks to its patent protection, the respondent said that this had not
altered the company's business strategies. That said, it was quite sure
that the value of its deals had decreased. It was difficult, the company
said, to quantify the impact because such deals included a variety of
factors of which patents are only one part, albeit an important one.
European companies' experiences with Myriad were similar to
their US counterparts. Two described that they had never patented
nature-based products, so the case had not affected them. A third
company thought that it may have acquired some US patents covering
isolated DNA in a deal five to ten years ago, but this had not become a
prominent business issue, as the patents were not part of their current
development strategies.
The remaining three European companies described more
substantial interactions with the case. Two said they had prosecuted
biomarker patents in Europe and the United States before and after
Myriad was decided and, as a resulted of the decision, had amended US
applications to obtain granted patents with narrower scopes of
protection compared with the European patents. Despite the narrower
US claims, they stated that their test development strategies remained
unaltered. Part of the explanation was that, overall, the breadth of their
US patent protection remained similar before and after Myriad when
one considered the narrowed claims in combination with other claims.
They also added that they had a normal degree of confidence (and
doubt) in the validity of their granted US patents. The sixth company
described a similar experience with the case, involving narrower US
claims but unchanged development strategies. This company, however,
raised another issue-namely, the narrower protection might devalue
commercialization licenses in the United States, resulting in a lower
royalty stream. The company considered that it might be overstating
this possibility, as it had other types of patent protection and many
other factors influence royalty calculations. Nevertheless, the company
still thought this was a valid concern.
3. TTOs
US TTOs were more aware of, and more affected by, Myriad
than the European TTOs. All the US TTOs commented that, after a
short learning period, they were relatively confident applying the
court's ruling in Myriad and knowing what was and was not eligible.
Four added, though, that claims to isolated naturally occurring
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compounds were not particularly valuable or common (even prior to the
case) and that the case had not affected their development strategies.
In contrast, two US TTOs described situations where the
decision had affected their development strategies. The first said that a
scientist had disclosed a molecular test based on a naturally occurring
compound and that, together, they had decided that without a patent
on the molecule they would have insufficient protection to develop the
test. In response, they decided the scientist should conduct additional
experiments to try to develop a slightly different test for which they
could obtain commercially valuable claims. Possible claims included
Myriad-compliant compounds (i.e., nature-based compounds that
were markedly different from naturally occurring equivalents) and
methods that covered different ways of performing the test and were
Mayo-compliant. The TTO reported that this research had generated
positive results; however, a patent was yet to be drafted. The other TTO
stated that an invention was disclosed to them that could not be
patented due to Myriad, and, therefore, they had forgone developing the
test. The TTO thought it may have been possible to conduct additional
experiments that could pave the way to a commercially valuable patent,
but the scientist did not have the interest, funding, or time to commit
to that possibility.
One US TTO also recounted a problem created by the Myriad
decision for a patent that had been previously granted. The TTO
described how a licensee contacted them shortly after the decision,
informing them they would stop paying royalties on a patent because it
was now invalid. The TTO expressed frustration at the fact that, in
hindsight, they probably could have drafted Myriad-eligible claims but,
due to the difficulties with reissue, this was never a viable option.
Echoing problems reported by European practitioners, two US
TTOs described problems stemming from Myriad in relation to
development of drugs. One described how the case stopped them from
applying for a patent on a molecule, and, therefore, research had been
redirected to assess whether they could produce a related molecule with
markedly different characteristics from the naturally occurring
molecule. The other TTO said that Myriad meant they could not patent
an active ingredient, and, therefore, development of it had ceased.
European TTOs were, in contrast, relatively unaffected by
Myriad. Two European TTOs were only vaguely aware of the case and
said it had not affected their activities. A third was quite familiar with
the case but only because it made headlines, not because the TTO had
noticed a business impact. Another two, who had filed biomarker
patents recently, said that issues surrounding the case had probably
arisen during US prosecution and were dealt with by outside counsel,
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but they could not recall any specific details. Both added that they had
not altered their development strategies as a result.
The sixth European TTO described how Myriad had affected one
development strategy but in an equivocal way. They narrowed some
claims as a result of Myriad-based rejections, and this altered their
business strategy for "deploying" the product. The interviewee chose not
to describe how exactly deployment had changed but noted that the
commercial value of the product and the patent claims had probably not
changed.
C. Adapting to Mayo: Drafting Claims, Uncertainty, and
Development Strategies
This Section details how interviewees adapted to issues
presented by Mayo. It focuses on changes to drafting patent claims,
certainty regarding the validity and the grant of patents, and changes
to commercial strategies for developing molecular tests.
1. Practitioners
US practitioners were resoundingly clear that Mayo had a more
significant impact on patent practice than Myriad. In particular, they
pointed out the difficulties they had applying the case to new tests due
to the legal uncertainty surrounding the decision and the need to
narrowly draft claims that undermined potential commercial value. In
response to these difficulties, the practitioners described what one
practitioner called a "toolbox" of strategies for obtaining claims or
delaying prosecution until a time when, they hoped, an event (e.g., a
legal decision or change in USPTO practice) would allow the
prosecution of claims with more clarity. The delay tactics involved filing
continuation and divisional applications. 14 3
The various strategies US practitioners deployed to obtain
claims had drawbacks. One strategy was to draft more independent
claims in a type of scattergun approach, hoping an examiner would
grant one. A second strategy was to seek additional interviews with
examiners to better understand the "idiosyncratic" way the examiner
was applying the case and even, hopefully, to agree on valid claims.
Other claim strategies focused on overcoming the "significantly more"
element from the second limb of the Mayo test. This built on the
principle that method claims directed to natural laws could be eligible
if they include activities that are not well understood, routine, or

143.

Guerrini et al., supra note 102, at 550.
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conventional. Practitioners reported drafting claims that incorporated
reagents or scientific techniques or, alternatively, a series of
conventional steps that on the whole created an unconventional
method.14 4 The drawbacks to these fall into two categories. First,
practitioners noted that drafting a large number of claims increased the
cost of prosecution, as did seeking interviews with examiners. Second,
they commented that including activities that were not well understood,
routine, or conventional usually resulted in a quite narrow scope and,
therefore, did not always confer broad protection;1 4 5 for example, a
competitor could supply a similar test by using a conventional reagent
(not the patented unconventional reagent) or replacing one of the steps
with a different step (or perhaps simply skipping the step).14 6
The uncertainty of drafting claims that an examiner would
accept as Mayo-compliant flowed into uncertainty about the validity of
granted claims. The US practitioners accepted that any granted claim
could be invalid if challenged in court, but, in their view, there was a
higher-than-normal risk that a court would disagree with examiners'
views on Mayo-related issues.
Despite the legal uncertainty, the US practitioners described
few instances where the case had affected clients' development
strategies. None could think of an instance in which a client had
abandoned development of a test. Likewise, none knew of a client that
had abandoned pursuing patent protection for a test, although two
described protracted, ongoing prosecutions that had not yet been
resolved. None of the practitioners knew of a client that had decided to
use trade secrets instead of patent protection. On the other hand, one
described an instance where a client chose not to litigate to enforce a
patent granted before the Mayo decision because of the risk of

&
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These and other drafting techniques have been previously reported. See, e.g., Miller
Amos, supra note 81, at 40-41; Nicholas J. Landau, Patenting Diagnostics and Biomarkers Six
Years After Mayo, PAT. 213 (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.patent2l3.com/2018/11/patenting-diagnostics-and-biomarkers-six-years-after-mayo/ [https://perma.cc/W7ZG-BMMZ].
145.
Three US practitioners also raised challenges regarding the drafting of molecular-test
claims that incorporated algorithms complying with the abstract ideas exclusion from Alice. This
topic was not pursued in this Article's study, however, because there are not clearly different
patent practices for abstract ideas and algorithms in the United States and Europe. See Aboy et
al., supra note 64, at 1125.
146.
Two practitioners raised the possibility that competitors might be able to avoid
infringement-of-method claims by arranging performance of the test by more than one actor. The
law concerning this issue has changed significantly in recent years. For a review, see Johnathon
E. Liddicoat, Divided Performance of PatentedMethods in Australia: A Call to Codify Procured
Infringement, 41 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 252, 255-62 (2018). The issue has been raised briefly
elsewhere in the context of molecular tests. See, e.g., Guerrini et al., supra note 102, at 551; Sachs,
supra note 19, at 1913-19. The practitioners commented that they raised this issue with clients
but stated it was considered ancillary to obtaining valid claims.
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invalidity. They chose instead to leave the granted patent "on the
books." Two practitioners thought the legal uncertainty reduced the
value of business deals, but another two disagreed with this, stating
that patent rights often played only a small role in the ultimate value
of test transactions. The other three practitioners had no experience
with this topic.
Mayo affected European practice as well, although not as
profoundly. Only one patent attorney described consistent issues
obtaining US patents for clients. They described similar concerns to
those expressed by the US attorneys: (i) ongoing difficulties with
drafting Mayo-compliant claims, (ii) concerns that the claims were too
narrow, and (iii) concerns that the granted claims were actually invalid.
Despite these issues, however, the practitioner said their clients had
not adjusted their development strategies. A second practitioner
explained that on one occasion when assisting with the filing of a US
patent, a Mayo-based rejection had arisen but the test involved an
unconventional technical step, and, therefore, they were able to
overcome the rejection (on the second step of the Mayo test) and draft
commercially valuable claims. A third practitioner noted that they were
in the process of prosecuting a US patent and expected to receive a
Mayo-based rejection, and they thought there was a high chance of
protracted prosecution. The remaining European practitioners were
aware of the issues Mayo raised but said they had not needed to study
the decision.
2. Companies
US companies generally commented that Mayo had been a
significant case for their businesses. Only one reported not being
affected by Mayo. The company in question, a start-up, was granted
patents after the decision but, prior to the interview for this study, was
unaware of the case. After a brief discussion of the case with the
interviewer, the company thought its patents were Mayo-compliant
because the claims applied a sophisticated, unconventional algorithm
that probed a range of relatively unknown biomarkers.
Each of the other US companies had been affected by Mayo, but
the magnitude of impact varied. One company, when prosecuting its
patents, described a similar scenario to the start-up mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. When acquiring a test from another business,
however, it took the view during due diligence that several key patents
were probably invalid under Mayo, and, in response to this risk, the
company abandoned the deal. Although quite an extreme response to
the risk of invalidity, it decided it was necessary because the test, once
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developed, would probably have been easy to imitate without patent
protection.
The other four US companies encountered prosecution
difficulties similar to those described by the US practitioners-for
example, protracted prosecution, narrow claims, and inconsistent
examiner application of Mayo. Despite these difficulties, though, none
said that the lack of patent protection or uncertainty surrounding
protection had stopped them from acquiring or developing a test. One
company even stated that it is "unlikely any company would kill a
product due to a patent."
Although these four companies continued developing their tests,
they reported other more nuanced effects. A common concern was that
the value of their patents had decreased. The companies struggled to
assign a numerical value, but their tone suggested it was a nontrivial
amount. One of these companies, a small company yet to launch a test,
explained that although it was content to develop its tests on a weak
patent position, it was conscious that potential acquirers might have a
different development strategy in mind requiring strong patents and
that, in the absence of strong patent protection, these companies would
no longer be interested.
The remaining three companies described different effects. The
second company described how the narrower claims it obtained after
Mayo led to lower reimbursement rates. It invests heavily in developing
novel tests with large amounts of clinical-utility data. Prior to Mayo,
the company used its patents to charge a premium by excluding
competitors. Since Mayo, however, narrower claims has meant less
certainty of excluding competitors. Therefore, when negotiating
reimbursement rates, payors are more likely to refuse premiums
because competitors could offer a similar test at a lower price.
The third company described how it had decided to use trade
secrets instead of patents. It said that prior to Mayo it would have
patented certain methods, but given the legal uncertainties of Mayo for
these types of claims, it had decided to keep the methods secret. The
company also noted that since it provides the test as an LDT, secrecy
was feasible. On the other hand, trade secrecy made it more difficult to
publish performance information about the test lest it reveal the
secrets, which in turn made it more difficult to convince payors to pay
a higher price or persuade medical professionals to use it.
For the last of these four companies, Mayo and a consequent
shift to trade secret protection influenced its decision-making about
releasing the test as an LDT or a kit. The company's formal strategy
was to launch a kit in addition to the LDT version of the test it already
offered. The interviewee explained, however, that since Mayo had
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weakened the company's patent position, it was now advantageous to
offer the test solely as an LDT to keep technical aspects of the test
"hidden from view." The company was hence contemplating abandoning
the kit launch to preserve its trade secrets.
Mayo affected the European companies interviewed less than
their US counterparts. Three had dealt with Mayo-related issues during
prosecution. One company described how it had avoided a Mayo
rejection by preemptively drafting narrower claims. The company's test
incorporated an unusual technique, and it explained that in these
circumstances Mayo had not prevented it obtaining US patent claims
that were sufficiently valuable for the company to develop its test. The
other two companies described more drawn-out patent prosecution, but
neither was particularly affected by the case. One thought that the
narrower claims it obtained meant it might get a lower license rate in
the United States but also that this was hard to predict. The other
company was yet to obtain its US patent (it was still pending at the
USPTO after two or three rejections) but was not perturbed. It intended
to launch its test in Europe before the United States and expected this
would provide other competitive advantages, including scientific lead
time, comprehensive data, and goodwill in the test. In the company's
opinion, these advantages meant that any uncertainty or narrowness
in its US claims would have a relatively trivial effect. Furthermore, its
algorithm was still a trade secret. The company considered this
particularly valuable because competitors would face difficulties trying
to reverse engineer the algorithm despite its plans, by the time of
launch, to publish on it and provide data to regulatory and
reimbursement bodies.
The other three European companies had obtained US patents
after Mayo was decided but were not aware of the case. After explaining
the case and asking why they had not heard of it, all three suggested it
was because their technology included clear advances over known
techniques. Accordingly, the USPTO probably reached a swift view that
the patent application included unconventional advances and fell
outside the Mayo exception to patent eligibility. One company also
opined that a reason why its patent did not receive a Mayo rejection
may have been because the company directed its claim to an assay that
detected the presence or absence of a pathogen. This may have been
sufficient to avoid the first limb of the Mayo test because the patent was
not directed to a medical correlation.
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3. TTOs
Similar to the US companies and practitioners, US TTOs found
Mayo a difficult case. As a starting point, all US TTOs echoed the points
made by US practitioners in relation to prolonged prosecution, narrow
claims, and uncertain validity of granted claims. Four TTOs also drew
attention to the fact that patent costs for protecting molecular tests had
increased substantially due to lengthier prosecution times.
They described a variety of drafting strategies to overcome
Mayo-related issues, but none were uniformly adopted. One TTO
described how they had claimed an assay for detecting a specific
biomarker by focusing on specific "mechanical aspects" of the assay,
instead of a diagnostic test that relied on a medical correlation. They
even thought that the claims were probably as broad as they would have
obtained pre-Mayo. The TTO noted, however, that this approach was
not always feasible, as some tests could not be described as an assay.147
Five TTOs also discussed overcoming Mayo-related issues by
incorporating tests into methods of medical treatments. One TTO
described that they were able to obtain claims with minimal fuss by
adopting this approach. Another two TTOs were critical of this
approach, however, commenting that it was not feasible for them
because they would need more data to support these types of claims and
their researchers had no interest or capacity to redirect their research
in this manner. The last two TTOs described this approach as feasible,
but only when a researcher was interested and had the resources for
the extra research.
While these experiences were similar to other interviewees'
experiences with Mayo, the challenges with patenting tests had more
serious outcomes for the TTOs. Several TTOs abandoned or considered
abandoning the development of tests. Five US TTOs said that they were
looking very closely at molecular-test projects and had many concerns,
and three of these TTOs had gone as far as abandoning patent filings
and development of at least one test. Indeed, one of these TTOs said
they were not developing "lots of promising products," and another
declared they "don't translate diagnostics." Three TTOs also reported
having licensees contact them to cancel licenses because the patents
were now invalid. The only TTO that had not lost a license or abandoned
a test was the one who described successfully linking their tests to
methods of medical treatments.
Although the US TTOs described different approaches for
patenting and developing tests, two issues they all agreed on were that

147.

The TTO chose not to elaborate on this point.
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they thought fewer VCs were interested in tests 148 and that fewer
companies were interested in partnering.
European TTOs described a very different experience with Mayo
compared with their US counterparts. Their development strategies
had not been affected by the case. Five said that they had no specific
memory of the case arising during prosecution or development strategy
meetings. They thought it was possible that the case had been raised
during prosecution but, if it had, presumed it had been dealt with by
external practitioners without raising concern. Indeed, two of the TTOs
commented they were unaware of the case prior to the interview, even
though they regularly dealt with molecular-test technology. One of the
TTOs differed from the other four in that they had discussed the case
with colleagues; they suggested that one reason the case had not arisen
in (or at least had not been significant for) their development strategies
was that their claims detailed unconventional instruments or
incorporated an unconventional technique, such as a previously
unpublished algorithm to diagnose a group of patients.
The sixth TTO described how the case had significantly
prolonged the prosecution process for several of their patents, but
eventually they obtained commercially valuable US claims and the
delay had not affected their development strategies. This TTO outlined
similar approaches to drafting claims as described above by the other
TTOs. They also mentioned that they typically filed their patents "late"
in order to generate more information about the delivery of the tests in
medical practice. This strategy had a further advantage. They found it
helped them overcome Mayo-related issues because the additional
information often meant they had worked out unconventional reagents,
instruments, or techniques that could be included in claims without
affecting the commercial value of the claim.
D. Does Myriad or Mayo DisadvantageUS-Headquartered
Organizations?
Prior to this Article's study, opinions differed on whether
US-headquartered organizations were more strongly disadvantaged by
Myriad or Mayo compared with European counterparts. It is often
argued that patent protection is important to an innovative domestic
economy. Yet, patent law applies equally to domestic and foreign
organizations. This means that all organizations developing tests can
seek patents in Europe, where they will engage with European patent
law, which permits a broader range of subject matter. It also means that
148.

Taylor, supra note 9, at 229.
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all organizations can seek patents in the United States, where they will
have to deal with more restrictive patentable subject-matter law, as
dictated by Myriad and Mayo.
As a general rule, US interviewees (practitioners, companies,
and TTOs) thought that patentable subject-matter thresholds were
easier to meet in Europe than in the United States. However, none
thought the differences in patent law disadvantaged US-headquartered
organizations compared with European counterparts. Explaining this
view, the US interviewees offered four reasons.
First, European patents can be obtained by anyone, including
US organizations. Thus, if European patents do confer a benefit, this
benefit is available to organizations on both sides of the North Atlantic.
Second, organizations that develop tests want, almost always, to launch
in the United States because that is where they make most profits.
Therefore, all organizations must engage with US patent law. Six US
interviewees described this reason as a consequence of the globalized
world. Third, although patent applications filed in Europe usually meet
patent-eligibility thresholds, problems are often encountered with other
patentability criteria (e.g., novelty, inventive step, nonobviousness).
Accordingly, any benefit gained through patentable subject matter
falls away during other stages of examination. Fourth, successful
development of molecular tests involves many challenges, of which
obtaining patent protection is only one. So even assuming European
patents are broader and granted more easily, this benefit to the
organization can be overridden by a milieu of other issues.
Despite such reasons, two US TTOs described how they had
considered focusing their development activities in Europe in view of
the differences in patent law. However, both went on to say that they
had not actioned this plan. One of their primary reasons to continue
focusing on the United States was that they had relatively limited
knowledge of the potential European licensees or VCs that would be
interested in their test.
European organizations had more diverse opinions on whether
cross-Atlantic legal differences in patent eligibility brought about
by Myriad and Mayo advantaged European organizations and
disadvantaged US organizations. Four European practitioners thought
that the cases did not disadvantage US-headquartered organizations,
raising the same four arguments mentioned by US organizations. On
the other hand, two European practitioners disagreed, taking the view
that US organizations were at a disadvantage. One reasoned that US
organizations tend to focus on their domestic markets, whereas
European organizations tend to focus on territorial markets outside the
United States. As a result, European companies could respond to
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Myriad and Mayo in a more agile way, focusing attention on
substantial, patent-friendly markets such as the United Kingdom and
Germany. The other European practitioner, sharing the view that US
organizations were at a disadvantage, had a client base with a high
proportion of TTOs and start-ups compared to many other attorneys.
The practitioner stated confidently that the cases, especially Mayo,
created a disadvantage for US organizations because organizations
working at the early stage of test development (like this practitioner's
clients) typically use patents to attract partners and VCs to develop
their tests, and this is easier if they can obtain broad patent protection
quickly and at low cost.
European companies were evenly split on the question.
Two companies thought the cases created a disadvantage for US
organizations. One of the explanations offered was that US companies
typically regard strong US patent protection as necessary for
early-stage test development, while molecular-test organizations in
Europe had a more global vision and were content to obtain stronger
patents in European markets (as well as other markets outside the
United States). The second company articulated its ideas with less
precision, merely stating that indirect benefits would flow to European
companies because they could obtain patents quicker and often with
broader scope. On the other hand, two European companies thought
Myriad and Mayo did not create any particular advantage or
disadvantage for European or US companies. One explained this with
reference to the concept of the "globalized world," and the other because
it thought the extra scope and speed to grant offered minimal
advantages. This company added that even if the cases did create
a disadvantage for US companies, it was minor and, overall, US
companies were still at an advantage because of the high number of
VCs there. The remaining European companies did not comment on this
topic, explaining that they were not familiar enough with the cases.
European TTOs were the only cohort where a clear majority
thought the cases created a disadvantage for US companies. 14 9 Only one
European TTO thought that the cases did not create a disadvantage,
basing this on the "globalized world." The other five European TTOs
offered several reasons why the legal position after Myriad and Mayo
effectively disadvantaged US companies and advantaged European
companies.
First, European organizations are more likely to file for patents
in Europe than US organizations. And since patents are typically
149.
Although two European TTOs were not familiar with Mayo before the interview, they
felt they understood the case well enough by the end of the interview to answer this question.
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necessary for the development of tests and procuring patent protection
for tests is often easier and cheaper in Europe, European organizations
are more likely to obtain the protection needed to develop tests in a
protected market.
Second, most VCs and partners they engaged with
were: (i) European, (ii) focused on European patent law, and
(iii) (largely) oblivious to how severely the US cases had affected patent
protection and practice there. 15 0 Thus, the local European environment
for tests had not changed, 15 1 whereas they were under the impression
the US venture-capital environment had changed significantly with
media coverage of Myriad and Mayo. 152
Third, one of the most important elements for the success of any
test is the data supporting it (e.g., data on its analytic and clinical
validity), and typically such data are first gathered in an organization's
home market. Accordingly, since European organizations could launch
in Europe with strong patent positions, then later launch in the United
States when their data were stronger, this strategy might avoid the
need for strong US patents because they would have the advantage of
a good evidence base as well as strong reputation and other competitive
advantages.
Fourth, pursuing a Europe-only launch of a test based on strong
local patent protection was a legitimate and feasible business objective,
particularly as a fallback from a US and European launch. These
five TTOs admitted, though, that relative disadvantage for US
organizations would not arise for every test, primarily because some
test technology was still patent eligible in the United States.
V. DISCUSSION: INSIGHTS FROM THE INTERVIEW DATA

The following three topics distill the interview data and describe
how the data provide insights into how Myriad and Mayo affect the
development of molecular tests. The first topic is whether molecular
tests can satisfy patentable subject-matter requirements in the United
States. The second topic is the adverse effects of Myriad and Mayo on
the development of molecular tests. The third topic is why the data
show that organizations in the United States are now at a relative
disadvantage compared to organizations in Europe.
150.
Taylor, supra note 9, at 229.
151.
One US practitioner did speculate that if VCs are only aware of local laws, then US
VCs might be more reluctant to fund early-stage US organizations because of concerns about
patenting, whereas European VCs' activities will remain unchanged. After reflecting further on
this possibility, though, the practitioner dismissed it.
152.
Taylor, supra note 9, at 229.
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A. Molecular Tests and Patent Eligibility
In the immediate aftermath of Myriad and Mayo, senior legal
commentators posited that molecular tests were no longer patent
eligible in the United States. The interview data demonstrate that this
is incorrect, at least as a blanket statement; many interviewees
described a variety of ways to draft valuable claims. Indeed, Myriad's
effect on patenting tests appears to be quite limited, with US
practitioners in particular describing how they were confident drafting
claims that complied with Myriad, and all stating confidently that they
had been able to obtain commercially valuable claims for clients.
Although one US TTO chose not to develop a test because Myriad
prevented them from patenting some biomarkers, all the other
organizations (TTOs and companies) said Myriad had not stopped them
from obtaining sufficient patent rights when required. These data
accord with patent-register data identified by one study. It found that
post-Myriad the numbers of gene-related patents continued to rise. 153
Although the numbers of patents granted for isolated DNA sequences
declined after Myriad, it found that these patents were already on a
downward trajectory, which probably would have continued even
without the Myriad decision.154
Mayo's impact on patent eligibility was more nuanced. The
interview data show that commercially valuable patent claims can be
obtained after Mayo, although experiences differed. Practitioners
stated they were able to obtain claims for clients. In contrast, three
TTOs stated they had forgone at least one patent application each due
to concerns about legal uncertainty and claims being too narrow. One
interpretation of these results is that commercially valuable claims
are available for only some tests post-Mayo. Another interpretation is
that valuable claims are generally available for all tests but only
after protracted, resource-intensive prosecution. The interview data
do not resolve this disagreement. But a consistent point with
both interpretations is that Mayo's most significant impact on patent
practice was the way in which it increased legal uncertainty.
Uncertainty
was a recurrent
theme
in interviews
when discussing Mayo. Respondents raised three issues in
particular: (i) whether claims could be drafted that were
Mayo-compliant (and valuable); (ii) how USPTO examiners would apply
Mayo to a patent application; and (iii) whether granted papers would
survive judicial review, a concern which also applied to patents granted
153.
154.

Myriad's Impact, supra note 20, at 1120.
Id. at 1120-22.
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before the decision. Uncertainty was also a major finding in the first
peer-reviewed study of Mayo-related patent filings and prosecutions.
The study, analyzing a USPTO art unit related to molecular tests, found
an allowance rate of 36 percent for applications that received a rejection
citing Mayo, 155 indicating that the majority of the applicants could not
or chose not to overcome the rejections. Moreover, findings indicated
that the number of annual Mayo-based rejections remained consistently
high in the six years preceding the study, indicating that the patent
profession had not worked out how to draft Mayo-compliant claims.1 56

Thus, from different perspectives, this study's interview data and
Aboy et al.'s data confirm that molecular tests remain patent eligible
post-Myriad and post-Mayo but that there is ongoing and substantial
uncertainty with the specific claims that are patent eligible. Mostly, the
uncertainty stems from Mayo.
B. The Adverse Effects of Myriad and Mayo for the Development of
Molecular Tests
This Section considers three types of adverse effects observed in
this Article's study. The first type, forgone test development, concerns
interview data detailing organizations that abstained from or
abandoned developing molecular tests. The second concerns how
patents on molecular tests have reduced in financial value. The third
concerns whether organizations are now using trade secrets instead of
patents during the development of tests.
1. Forgone Test Development
Several patent-law theorists predicted that the decisions in
Myriad and Mayo would adversely affect the development of tests. One
theorist stressed that molecular tests are expensive to develop and
validate and, therefore, typically require investment from VCs.

15 7

Another stressed that few organizations have the necessary resources
and skills in-house to develop tests by themselves and therefore require
partners with complementary skills, which patents help attract.1 58 Both
argued that § 101 law pre-Myriad and pre-Mayo was necessary for high
rates of innovation because broad exclusive patent rights act as a type
of security for investments, such as capital injections, as well as other
resources, such as labor, and that they help prevent free riding. Thus,
155.
156.
157.
158.

Mayo's Impact, supra note 20, at 515.
Id. at 516.
Holman, supra note 11, at 307-08.
Daily & Kieff, supra note 86, at 973-74.
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Myriad and Mayo, which narrowed patent protection, would likely
reduce the incentive to invest in test development.
The interview data show that (i) one TTO did not develop a test
because of Myriad, (ii) three TTOs did not develop tests because of
Mayo, and (iii) one company abandoned acquiring a test due to Mayo.
These data, therefore, support the predictions. Furthermore, the data
predominantly support their reasons: TTOs said that the most
important role patents play in their organizations is attracting partners
and VCs. In addition, however, the data bring to the fore some
important nuances not mentioned by the patent-law theorists.
One nuance is that the data just summarized show TTOs
are more affected than companies. TTOs and universities were not
singled out by the theorists. A second detail, closely related to the
first, concerns the roles that patents play for companies compared
with TTOs. The interview data show that TTOs are more dependent
on patents-they have fewer competitive advantages available to
them-and, due to constraints on funding, are more sensitive to the
cost of protracted patent prosecution. In effect, they are "patent
precarious": organizations that are particularly susceptible to changes
in patent law that narrow protection or make patents difficult to obtain.
This precariousness is exacerbated, too, by the fact that technologies
emerging from TTOs are at their most immature and, therefore, their
riskiest stage of development for investment.15 9
Patent precariousness also helps explain the difficulties two US
companies experienced with transferring tests. One company stated
that it abandoned acquiring a test from a start-up due to Mayo-related
invalidity. The second, a small company, continued test development
but anticipated more limited interest from potential partners due to
Mayo. Both the start-up in the first scenario and the small company in
the second scenario were yet to obtain regulatory approval, negotiate
reimbursement, or scale up production of a test. The small company
kept some trade secrets, but the start-up, according to the interviewee,
had none of significance. These companies relied heavily on patents.
The idea that some organizations, particularly small ones, are
patent precarious is consistent with other theoretical and empirical
work. Economists in 1982 suggested that small companies might rely
on patents because they lack other means to protect their development
investments. 16 0 The point is also consistent with foundational literature
159.

Bronwyn H. Hall & Josh Lerner, The Financing of R&D and Innovation, in 1

HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 615 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds.,

1st ed. 2010).
160.
Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 797, 831 (1987); see also Roberto
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on the competitiveness of firms that posits that companies need
competitive advantages to gain market traction and that small
organizations in resource-intensive industries find it particularly
difficult to handle market forces without patent protection since they
usually have access to only a small number of possible competitive
advantages. 161 At least two lines of empirical research support this idea.
First, professors Ashish Arora and Marco Ceccagnoli conducted
research on whether patent protection increases companies' ability to
license technology. 162 The researchers found that licensing propensity
correlated with increased patent protection but only when companies
lacked "complementary assets," a type of competitive advantage, which
the authors defined as assets that are costly and time-consuming to
acquire and which complement the product sold1 63 (e.g., trade secrets
and manufacturing capabilities). 164 Second, economist Scott Shane's
analysis of patents assigned to the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology between 1980 and 1996 shows that wide patent scope
correlated with new business formation. That is, the wider a patent's
scope, the more likely a business will be formed that acquires the patent
from the university.16 5
Two further lines of empirical research support the more specific
idea that patent precariousness is an issue for small molecular-test
organizations. A 2008 survey of US start-ups found that medical device
start-ups, a category that includes molecular-test start-ups, rated
patents as 3.3 out of 4 on a scale of importance (with 4 being the highest
importance) for capturing competitive advantage. 166 The second piece of
empirical research shows a different side of precariousness: when the
prosecution of patents becomes expensive and difficult, precarious
companies stop obtaining them. A study shows that the number of
patents granted to small entities, which includes TTOs if they have not

Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection:A Contribution
to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL'Y 273, 276 (1998); Scott Shane, Technological Opportunities
and New Firm Creation, 47 MGMT. SCI. 205, 209 (2001).
161.
See generally Robert M. Grant, The Resource-BasedTheory of Competitive Advantage:
Implications for Strategy Formulation, 33 CAL. MGMT. REV. 114, 133 (1991); Michael E. Porter,
The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan. 2008, at 78; David J.
Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration,
Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL'Y 285 (1986).
162.
Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and
Firms'Incentives for Technology Licensing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 293, 294 (2006).
Id.
163.
164.
The cited study focused on manufacturing capabilities. Id. at 297.
165.
See generally Shane, supra note 160, at 209.
166.
Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1290 (2009).
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licensed the patent, 167 has declined after Myriad: prior to the decision,
about one-third of applicants were small entities, and this has since
dropped to almost zero. 168
Consequently, although this study's findings-that Myriad and
Mayo had negative effects on small organizations due to the increased
precariousness of their patent portfolios-are based on a relatively
modest number of interviews, the idea has substantial theoretical and
empirical support.
2. Value Reduction
Four US companies reported that the financial value of their
patents had reduced due to Mayo, and one US company and one
European company reported patent value had reduced due to Myriad.
The legal theorists did not specifically predict this effect, but
practitioners did. 169 Each of the companies describing this issue said
reduced patent value resulted in reduced value of financial deals,
including reimbursement, but none of the companies knew by how
much.
This is clearly a negative effect for the individual companies
interviewed, but whether it is an adverse effect from a public
perspective of technology development is more complex. One could
argue that if a transaction is modestly profitable for an organization
that develops a test, then the laws influencing the value of the
technology are operating sufficiently well. However, since one of the
primary drivers of this reduction is the higher-than-normal level of
uncertainty surrounding granted and pending patents, then to this
extent at least the reduction in value is negative.
3. Trade Secrets
A number of commentators have argued that, from society's
perspective, changes in patent law have a negative impact when they
fail to incentivize firms to disclose technological information and firms
retain it as a trade secret. 170 An interview-based study explored the
adoption of this strategy in gene technology but found no instances of it
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37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2019).
167.
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Myriad's Impact, supra note 20, at 1122.
169.
See, e.g., Sean Sheridan, How Mayo, Myriad andAlice May Impact Patent Valuations,
LAW360 (Mar. 4, 2015, 8:48 AM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/626370/how-mayo-myriad-andalice-may-impact-patent-valuations [https://perma.cc/E2NV-8BYF].
170.
Guerrini et al., supra note 102, at 544-45; W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents,
and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1418-19 (2016); see generally LANDES
POSNER, supra note 1, at 326-28; Bambauer, supra note 100, at 837-40.
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occurring. The results of this Article's study confirm increased interest
in trade secret protection as a strategy for test development but found
only one instance of it occurring. This supports the view that trade
secrets hold increasing interest for test developers, but initial uptake
appears low.
A related issue emerging from the interview data is that in
response to Myriad and Mayo, companies were choosing to provide a
test as an LDT instead of a kit to preserve trade secrets. The study
recorded one instance of a US company choosing this strategy and
another instance of a US company considering it. Unlike using trade
secrets instead of patents, patent theorists have not previously
predicted a shift to LDT technology nor the implications of this industry
movement. In other fields the issue is familiar, 17 1 and there is an active
debate about whether the FDA should regulate LDTs, especially due to
safety and accuracy concerns. 172 In an environment where LDTs are
arguably insufficiently regulated, it is a negative effect for Myriad and
Mayo to have underpinned a shift in this direction.
C. Explaining the Relative Disadvantagefor US-Headquartered
Organizations
As previously mentioned, respondents had mixed views about
whether Myriad and Mayo disadvantaged US-headquartered
organizations more than their European counterparts. In the main, US
organizations thought there was no noticeable difference. However,
quite a number of European organizations, particularly TTOs, thought
they were able to deal with the implications of Myriad and Mayo more
easily than US organizations. It is also revealing that four US
organizations decided against acquiring or developing a test due to
Mayo and one decided against developing a test due to Myriad, whereas
no European organization decided not to develop or acquire a test.
Notwithstanding the small sample size, 173 the results on this
issue speak to debates about whether local conditions of patent
protection are significant for local innovation. On the one hand, patent

171.
See, e.g., Arielle Duhaime-Ross, Theranos Isn't the Only Diagnostics Company
Exploiting Regulatory Loopholes, VERGE (Nov. 11, 2015, 8:28 AM), https://www.theverge.com/science/20 15/11/11/9706356/fda-theranos-health-diagnostics-cancer-tests-regulation-loophole-ldt
[https://perma.cc/2TVE-TWDM].
See Sachs, supra note 19, at 1884-99; see also Kelly Holloway et al., Dangerous
172.
Diagnostics? Regulatory Reform in the Genomic Era, 364 BRIT. MED. J. 1640 (2019); Jeffrey N.
Gibbs, LDTs: The Saga Continues, FDLI, https://www.fdli.org/2017/04/ldts-saga-continues/
[https://perma.cc/XBN2-69BW] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
173.
SCHUTT, supra note 108, at 165.

834

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:4:785

protection appears to establish a level playing field, since the legal
thresholds apply to any organization (local or foreign headquartered)
seeking patent protection in the jurisdiction. However, several reasons
emerged that support the view that Myriad and Mayo disadvantaged
US-headquartered organization more than European counterparts,
even though both groups must meet § 101 thresholds to acquire US
patent protection.
First, US organizations commented that they primarily focus on
the US market, whereas Europeans focus on US and European markets
with roughly equal intensity; and some European organizations
entertain business strategies that exclude the United States, whereas
no US organization said they would do this. Second, US TTOs and
companies described diminished VC and partner interest in molecular
tests as a result of the cases,17 4 whereas no European organizations
described this. The explanation is that local VCs and partners play
important roles in innovation,1 7 5 especially for TTOs, 176 and that
European VC investors were less perturbed by, or perhaps less aware
of, US legal developments.
Third, European organizations described business strategies
that mitigated weak US patent rights, including relying on European
and other non-US patent rights; relying on European and other non-US
VCs; only partnering with European and non-US organizations; and
launching tests in Europe before launching in the United States, using
strong data generated in Europe. None of these strategies were
mentioned by US interviewees.
Fourth, the interview data strongly indicate that Mayo generally
made patent prosecution lengthier and more costly. This outcome,
however, interferes with TTOs' business strategy of prosecuting patents
and transferring the technology swiftly and cheaply. European TTOs
experienced Mayo's effects on prosecution, but US TTOs were more

Taylor, supra note 9, at 229.
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See generally David B. Audretsch & Paula E. Stephan, Company-ScientistLocational
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sensitive to the effects because they more precariously rely on US
patents.
On balance, the results support the view that US organizations,
particularly patent-precarious TTOs, have been more strongly
disadvantaged by Myriad and particularly Mayo compared with
European counterparts. The results, however, do not permit an
assessment of how frequently the disadvantages arise.
VI. STUDY LIMITATIONS: REASONS FOR CAUTION PRIOR TO
LAW REFORM

This Article's study shows that Myriad and Mayo have adversely
affected the development of some molecular tests and that the cases
may create disadvantages for US-headquartered organizations.
However, care must be taken before relying on this evidence as a basis
for law reform. It is better to see it as indicative, but nonconclusive,
evidence of overall trends. There are three reasons for careful reading
of this evidence.
First, the sample size for the interviews is appropriate for an
interview-based study but is small relative to the entire industry. The
methodology does not accurately indicate the percentage of test
organizations that have been negatively impacted in the wider
population, nor the full number of tests that companies and TTOs chose
not to develop, nor the amounts by which the value of molecular-test
deals have reduced.
Second, there may have been some selection bias. The
invitations sent to potential interviewees stated that this study was
investigating the US Supreme Court cases of Myriad and Mayo. Some
organizations may have ignored the invitations because they develop
tests with little reliance on patent protection or have little interest in
the Supreme Court cases. This is particularly plausible for tests that
might be developed, for example, with public money or that build on
existing technology, biomarkers, or clinical-utility data. A few
interviewees illustrated this idea, pointing out that hospitals have been
developing panel tests that are less innovative than their tests because
the panels draw primarily on existing technology and publicly available
data.
Third, this study was designed to assess the negative effects of
Myriad and Mayo, not the positive ones that might balance out the
adverse impacts. The most obvious potential positive effect of the
decisions is the one argued by the Supreme Court: the decisions would
unshackle "basic tools of scientific and technological work" from patent
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protection, enabling wider and easier use.17 7 If the patent practice
before the decisions did tie up these "tools," then various fields of
innovation may have flourished in the years afterward. To the Authors'
knowledge, research has not investigated this topic from an empirical
perspective. Three US TTOs in this study volunteered information
(it was not pursued by the interviewer) that they were developing
projects that, at least in part, incorporated technology that was
patented until Myriad invalidated the protection.
Previous empirical studies found that biomedical scientists
rarely become aware of protective patents and redirect research to avoid
patent infringement. 178 In contrast, the interview data suggest it might
be more common for researchers to learn something is no longer
patented, or that only a narrow patent exists, and subsequently
deliberately move into that technical field. Thus, the potentially
positive effects of Myriad and Mayo still need further examination
before it can be concluded that the negative effects warrant
law reform.1 79 Relatedly, Myriad and Mayo affect more than
molecular-test development. For instance, they are having an impact
on drug development. Two interviewees stated Myriad had stopped
development of a drug, one US TTO said Myriad had redirected
research on a drug, and one European practitioner said Myriad posed a
serious issue for the development of one of their client's drugs. These
points are consistent with a study that indicated that Myriad is more
frequently cited by the USPTO to reject non-DNA than DNA patent
applications. Since Myriad and Mayo affect scientific research other
than molecular-test technology, it would be prudent to understand
these effects before devising any law reform.
Proceeding
with policy
or
legislative
reform
before
understanding the effects of the cases better is likely to be premature,
poorly targeted, and insufficient and may even lead to more
uncertainty. Further research is important.
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VII. CONCLUSION

Myriad and Mayo significantly changed US patent practice and
created significant divergence with European law on patentable subject
matter. Previous studies of Myriad and Mayo have examined
macrolevel effects, and this Article's study aimed to examine the
negative effects of Myriad and Mayo at the organizational level by
interviewing patent practitioners, executives at molecular-test
companies, and managers in technology-transfer offices at research
institutes. The sample size of interviewees is small relative to the
size of the molecular-test industry, meaning the results are only
indicative of overall trends. However, since little is known about the
molecular-test industry, this study provides context-rich information on
how and when the negative effects arise. This information is vital to
understanding the effects of the cases on the molecular-test industry
and to developing evidenced-based patent law and policy.
This study has three main findings. First, Myriad and Mayo
have negatively affected the development of tests in several
ways. Notably, several organizations deliberately chose to forgo
developing tests, and many have found the legal uncertainty following
the cases problematic. Second, small patent-precarious organizations
(those that rely heavily on patents for competitive advantage) have
been more affected by the decisions than other organizations. Third,
US-headquartered organizations have been more affected by the cases
than European organizations, even though both types of organizations
file US patents under the same eligibility law-a result that the
majority of interviewees did not expect. The basis for this disadvantage
is that European organizations do not, as a general rule, rely on US
patents as significantly as US organizations do.
These results show that Myriad and Mayo have adversely
affected the development of some molecular tests and that the cases
may create disadvantages for US-headquartered organizations. Yet this
Article does not recommend reform. A key reason for this unwillingness
is that this study was designed to assess only the negative effects of
Myriad and Mayo, not the positive ones. The most obvious potential
positive effect is the one argued by the Supreme Court: that the
decisions would unshackle "basic tools of scientific and technological
work." Until the positive effects are understood, reform is premature.

